

Man, This Enemy

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failed. In fact, History itself exploded one after another ^{ooo} the formulas that have been considered binding. This time, however, the rulers have mastered dialectics so, they assert, they will know how to modify the doctrine as new necessities arise. The judgments of an individual man can always be wrong; the only solution is to submit unreservedly to an authority that claims to be unerring.

But what can the doctrine do about the unformulated longings of men? Why does a good Communist, without any apparent reason, suddenly put a pistol to his head? Why does he escape abroad? Isn't this one of those chasms over which the scientifically constructed bridges pass? People who flee from the people's democracies usually give as their chief motive the fact that life in these countries is psychically unbearable. They stammer out their efforts to explain: "The dreadful sadness of life over there"; "I felt I was turning into a machine." It is impossible to communicate to people who have not experienced it the undefinable menace of total rationalism.

To forestall doubt, the Party fights any tendency to ⁶⁶¹ delve into the depths of a human being, especially in ¹⁵⁶ literature and art. Whoever reflects on "man" in general, on his inner needs and longings, is accused of bourgeois sentimentality. Nothing must ever go beyond the description of man's behavior as a member of a social group. This is necessary because the Party, treating man exclusively as the by-product of social forces, believes that he becomes the type of being he pictures himself to be. He is a social monkey. *What is not expressed does not exist.* Therefore if one forbids men to explore the depths of human nature, one destroys in them the urge to make such explorations; and the depths in themselves slowly become unreal.

I should like to clear up in advance a possible misunderstanding. ^{ooo} Personally, I am not in favor of art that is too

471 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening controls when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.
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World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the kolkhozy intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy, [66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one

[65] stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war. Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the kolkhozy was the shift from the zveno (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (agrogoroda), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletariat. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms." 33

33 Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";⁴ instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat.

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accompanied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.⁵ Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the

⁴ Mitrany, p. 179.

⁵ Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

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423 early years did not require the radical reorientations of the official attitude toward the peasantry and the land so characteristic of later policy in Eastern Europe. The concessionary New Economic Policy itself introduced in 1921, was invariably labeled a "retreat" imposed by circumstances, and Lenin left little doubt that "two steps forward" would follow this "one step backward." However, the post-war Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, empirical and opportunistic, swung with the political tides, professing convenient belief in any economic measures which would increase their political control.

- 661 These differences are not merely in the *tactics* of revolution, but rather in the changing character of Communism itself. In his volume, Mitrany emphasizes the increasing degree to which contemporary Stalinist Communists were preoccupied with the question of power.⁶ Whereas Bela Kun's dictatorship in Hungary in 1919 sacrificed political power partly because it refused to permit or encourage land reforms, Rakosi's post-war dictatorship appealed to popular support by expediting the reform of the land.⁷ Indeed, it was Rakosi himself who gave classic elaboration of the new political methods and spirit of Communism in his famous 1952 discussion of "salami tactics." Rather than defeating the Smallholders Party by frontal attack, he explained, they were defeated by ceaseless internal manipulations:

This gradual, day-by-day 'slicing off' of the reaction lurking within the Smallholders' Party was . . . termed 'salami tactics.' In the course of our incessant struggle against the enemy, its strength was gradually frittered away, and its impact on the working class was waning.⁸

"Salami tactics," then, describe the method by which opposition was suffocated by slow strangulation rather than by outright struggle. This policy demanded a degree of hypocrisy rarely required by Lenin's more forthright methods. Thus, the Bulgarian Communist, Anton Yugov, could declare in 1944 that "this Government, of which I am a member, and on whose behalf I speak, categorically

⁶ Mitrany, p. 170: "Whatever the theoretical pretenses that still surrounded" the Communist movement, he writes, "the issue [had] narrowed down to a question of sheer power."

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 186: "In 1919 the Socialist groups victorious in Munich, Vienna, and Budapest had proclaimed the Marxist agrarian program and, so, quickly lost power; the new regimes controlled by the Communists after 1945 elaborately buried the program so as to retain power."

⁸ *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March-April, 1952.

denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria." And Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Communist, was able to state in 1946 that the main struggle was not between "capitalism and socialism," but between "democracy and reaction *within* capitalism." Within a year or two both Yugov and Nagy were to repudiate these statements completely; but repudiation was impossible until the necessary maneuvers had taken place within the Government which made the Communists no longer dependent upon a minimum of popular acceptance. 661 ●

This policy of revolution *from above* and *by degrees* influenced every aspect of East European Communist policy, and distinguished it from the earlier Soviet experience. It reflected the degree to which the East European Communist Parties were not indigenous groupings of revolutionary idealists, but agents of an expanding imperial system, bureaucratically organized, and highly regimented. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Communists had important working class support, the seizure of power was engineered from the Ministry of Interior rather than fought in the streets. Elsewhere, working class support was either non-existent, as in Romania, or minimal, as in Poland, where 1946 shop elections showed the Socialists three times as popular among the workers as the Communists.

This absence of any genuine national support, and the close attachment of these bureaucratized parties to the Soviet military apparatus, made the use of "salami tactics" in the political realm absolutely necessary. The same factors applied to the Communist land policy. The Satellite Parties were no more capable of a Stalinist "offensive on the land," a frontal attack on peasant economy and society, than they had been of a Leninist assault on the centers of governmental power. The same process of "slow suffocation" which had brought the Communists to political power was the only weapon by which the Communists could alter the land structure.

2. *The Pattern and Pace of Collectivization*

The transfer of the Soviet agricultural system to Eastern Europe is a complex and many-sided story, the details of which vary greatly from one country to the next. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, for example, efforts to impose the Soviet pattern were begun immediately after the close of the Second World War, while in Poland and 423 661

* See Gluckstein, pp. 131-142, for a full account of the Communist attempt to pose as defenders of the status quo in 1944-45.

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● 661 Czechoslovakia no serious attempts were made until four years later. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, collectivization has profoundly altered the structure of agrarian economy, while in Poland the pre-Communist land system still remains substantially intact. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the collectivization drive, or at least the major effort, was compressed into a relatively short period of time, though elsewhere in the Satellite sphere the land offensive was diffused over several years. In Hungary, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia, the 1953 agrarian crisis has forced the dissolution of an appreciable number of collective farms; but in Poland and Bulgaria the effects of this area-wide crisis, though real, are scarcely as inclusive. These variations in pattern are a reflection of the degree to which Satellite collectivization is a function, not primarily of Communist doctrinal predilections, but of specific local forces and conditions. The general goal was everywhere the same—subordination of free agriculture to the demand of urban-industrial Communist society—but in practice agrarian policies have never been entirely uniform. Among those forces and conditions affecting the pace and intensity of Satellite collectivization were such variables as the strength of the peasant traditions of independent farming, the position of the individual Satellite in the over-all Soviet economic design, the structure of the prevailing land system, the degree of planned industrialization, and the size and dynamism of the national party.

The intimate connection between Communist agricultural policy and the demands of a totalitarian industrial economy was first elaborated by Stalin himself in 1928, when he acknowledged indirectly that the primary goal of collectivization was the increased State share in agricultural production. The Satellite theoreticians were not as blunt as Stalin and usually clothed their economic designs in elaborate ideological terminology. Perhaps the most direct statement on the subject, however, was made by the Yugoslav economic planner, Boris Kidric, in 1947, at a time when his country was the most orthodox and militant of the Satellite states. "The business of agriculture in a Socialist society," he stated, "is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."¹⁰

The variety of policies put forward in the ensuing years were derived from this basic goal. Much as the Communists attempted

¹⁰ *Borba*, (Belgrade), April 25, 1947.

to demonstrate that their policies were motivated by concern for the peasantry, it was clear that the question of ensuring "supply" of "food" for the cities remained the cornerstone of Communist agrarian policy. And though Kidric argued that to achieve this goal the Party was faced with the "categorical imperative of undertaking urgent measures to raise work productivity in agriculture," the hypocrisy of this statement was revealed by the simultaneous decision to allocate the barest minimum of national funds for the effort. Indeed, as the policy itself unfolded, it became clear that what Kidric meant was that it was the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society" to supply goods to the city at a price which the new urban bureaucracy was willing to pay, and that price was very low. Kidric's superior, Tito, was quite frank with regard to this problem: 423 661

In the same way as we must do our best to make ourselves independent of weather conditions in agriculture, so we must never allow ourselves the luxury of depending on the good will of private food producers. We must undertake measures to secure the necessary food for our industrial population and for carrying forward our Socialist projects. We must protect our food supply against chaos in production and distribution caused by the existence of tens of thousands of small and independent farms.¹¹

It was precisely to this extent that the Communists were interested in agriculture. If, in the process of "protecting" themselves from the "chaos" of "tens of thousands of small and independent farms," the level of agricultural production increased, the Communists would indeed be overjoyed; but such an improvement would be peripheral to the basic goal, which was redistribution of the crop rather than its improvement.

To implement this redistribution two courses were open to the State, only one of which was consistent with power realities in Eastern Europe and Communist industrial plans. 1) By increasing the flow of industrial goods from the city to the country, the Communists could stimulate the peasantry to place a greater share of their produce on the market. 2) By creating an agricultural structure through which the State could exercise direct administrative control, the Communists could force the peasantry to increase the share of goods marketed. It was the latter course which was consistent with the Eastern European political situation; and the Com-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, November 4, 1953.

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 ● 661 mmists, with the Russian experience guiding them closely, followed it. The decision to collectivize was essentially the decision to pursue this path, for the increased exploitation of the peasantry implicit in it was the only path consistent with "carrying forward of our Socialist projects." The basic preparation for collectivization was therefore in the seizure or creation of those organs of repression through which the Communists could exercise the necessary political control.

The groundwork for post-war collectivization was consequently not laid in the countryside, where Communist influence in these early years was small and generally limited to the new State Farms, but in the cities, where the Parties slowly extended their control over the State apparatus. Once the levers of governmental power were secured, the Communists were able to exert relentless pressure on the farms.

The tactics of the East European Parties in this "offensive" phase were never military, except perhaps in Yugoslavia, where political conditions most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinist era. And even in Yugoslavia the chief weapon was slow economic strangulation of the peasantry, an erosive process designed to break the will to resist and in the end leave the class disunited, despairing, and helpless. The offensive tactics of the bureaucratically-minded Satellite Parties deserve more detailed exposition.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE

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 471 This was the most direct means by which the Satellite Parties sought to destroy the independent peasant. Everywhere in the sphere compulsory tax and crop delivery schedules were promulgated, discriminating heavily against the independent sector, and particularly against middle and rich peasants. Collecting revenue was never a primary end of the tax decrees, though funds forced from the countryside were often considerable. Confiscatory delivery quotas served the additional and important function of guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs for the urban-industrial centers. The primary economic end—the eventual bankruptcy of the individual producer, who in the early post-war years was still thriving by selling on the free and black markets—is well illustrated by the 1953 delivery schedules for Czechoslovakia. On the best land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver three times as much grain to the State *per hectare* as a peasant owning two hec-

tares. On the poorest land in the country a peasant with five 661● hectares had to deliver almost twice as much per hectare as a 471 peasant with two hectares.¹² In Romania, a peasant with four hectares of land was required to deliver three-and-a-half times as much produce per hectare as a peasant holding two hectares of land.¹³ This pattern was followed throughout the area.

Prices paid for produce were invariably low and insofar as com- 435
parison is possible, lower than pre-war prices, as manifest in the 471
huge discrepancies between free market prices and State prices. Moreover, the discrepancy between the prices paid to the peasantry and prices charged in retail shops for the same commodities far exceeded the cost of transportation and processing incurred by the State. In some cases a "coupon" system, ostensibly designed to compensate the peasant, was instituted. Under these terms, foodstuffs and industrial crops delivered to official collection centers were paid for by small sums in currency and coupons entitling the peasant to buy, at low controlled prices, in State shops. In practice, the system generally proved to be nothing more than a propaganda device. Since consumer goods were in short supply, and usually reserved for the urban market, the villages were frequently without such basic commodities as matches and kerosene.

Nevertheless, the confiscatory tax and delivery schedules were 471
seldom fully enforced. It has, in fact, been demonstrated that literal 661
enforcement was impossible, since in countless cases the State demands exceeded the individual peasant's capacity to produce. The quota levels and the severe legal punishments decreed for quota arrears were not, however, entirely unrealistic. The penalties prescribed for under-delivery were invoked only when it suited the regime purposes for a gradual extension of control over the agrarian economy. The effect of cumulative delivery failures was intended to reduce the independent peasant to the status of a tenant at sufferance, since he could be legally expropriated whenever the State chose.

The control the State exercised over industrial and financial sectors of East European economies was similarly an important weapon in the campaign against the peasant. As a result of heavy industrial emphasis, the agricultural sector was generally denied help from nationalized credit institutions. Insofar as credit was ex-

¹² Decree of the Ministry of Bulk Purchasing, January 30, 1953.

¹³ *Scantela*, (Bucharest). May 18, 1950.

471 tended to agriculture at all, the State and collective farms received
 661 a disproportionate share. In effect, this policy meant the gradual depreciation of the meager equipment still owned by the peasantry, and further impeded the free peasant's purchase of vitally needed fertilizers and improved seed. This policy, it should be stressed, was an integral part of the general Communist tendency of neglecting agriculture as a whole.¹⁴

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE

661 It is impossible to determine exactly the degree to which Satellite collectivization drives depended upon application of administrative or police force. The testimony of escapees, the observations of outside observers, the frequent regime admonitions against administrative divergence from the "voluntary principle," and many statements by Communist leaders on the subject in 1953 New Course speeches, make it clear that the role of force was considerable.¹⁵ At the same time the application of force in Eastern Europe did not approach in scale or intensity the frankly military offensive against the peasantry conducted in the Soviet Union in 1928-32.

Officially the Satellite regimes have always adhered to the "voluntary principle" of collectivization, invoking the principle whenever the regimes decided to decelerate collectivization. For example, when collectivization was halted in Bulgaria in mid-1950, the regime raised the "voluntary principle" to the level of a basic State doctrine.¹⁶ Likewise, the halt in collectivization in Poland in mid-1951 was accompanied by a series of trials of low-echelon Communists alleged to have resorted to the use of violence against the peasantry.¹⁷ In general, application of force—beatings, jailings, and occasional executions of "kulak terrorists"—was an important, but clearly secondary, collectivization method in the Satellites. Undoubtedly the intense scrutiny of international public opinion partly

¹⁴ See pp. 87-88 for a more extensive discussion of the investment schedules of the Satellite governments, and other issues relative to the balance between industry and agriculture.

¹⁵ For example, Imre Nagy, speaking on July 4th, 1953, acknowledged that in collectivization "too much bullying was used," which "not only offended the peasants' sense of justice but also caused serious economic harm." (*Szabad Nep*, [Budapest], July 5, 1953.)

¹⁶ An editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia), October 28th, 1950, stated, for example, that "The Communist Party has always stressed in the most categorical way that it is absolutely necessary to observe strictly the voluntary principle of entering collectives."

¹⁷ See, for example, the reports on the trials held in Gryfice (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], May 25th, 1951).

accounts for the reluctance to apply force. Undoubtedly, too, the stern memories of the horrors of Soviet collectivization, which nearly cost the Stalinist regime its life, influenced developments in Eastern Europe and led to the refusal to take such risks once again. 66/ ●

But the basic cause lay in the nature of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe. The East European Communist Parties did not possess the necessary reserves of mass fanaticism to draw upon in a frankly military onslaught; the cadres of experienced and zealous workers upon whom Stalin relied to enforce his campaign in 1928-32 simply did not exist. In addition, a blunt attack would have been entirely inconsistent with the slow and cautious approach embodied in the concept of "salami tactics."

SOCIAL PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA

In the early post-war years the East European Parties sought to identify their own cause with the economic advancement of the peasant masses. Consequently, until 1948, militant propaganda in the countryside was confined to attacks on "Fascist collaborators," estate owners, and the "village rich."

With the consolidation of Communist power, the tenor of Party propaganda changed. The "kulak" was singled out for increasingly bitter treatment foreshadowing an offensive against the peasantry as a whole.

With the consolidation of political power in 1948-49, the tone of Party propaganda changed radically. Under the guise of purging the countryside of the "kulaks", it assumed an essentially anti-peasant tone. Vulko Chervenkov flatly stated that the peasants' "sense of private property" had to be eradicated, betraying the fact that collectivization was aimed at the entire peasantry, not merely at the "kulak."¹⁸ While the statistics indicate that a small class of

¹⁸ The term "kulak" as first applied in the Soviet Union denoted a specific group — those enterprising peasants whose growth the Czarist Minister Stolypin had encouraged before the war. The size of this group was greatly diminished by the egalitarianism of the 1917-18 peasant revolution, so that, even with the resurgence of the kulak in the NEP period of the twenties, the kulaks produced less than a third as much grain as they had produced before the war. Consequently, when Stalin raised the slogan, "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class," he was trying to capitalize on the traditional enmity toward a class whose significance no longer merited such wide attention. Clearly he was attempting to use the "anti-kulakism" of the peasantry as a blind under which a policy directed at a much larger group could be conducted. The term "kulak" no longer designated a specific group, but was directed against any group obstructing Communist land policy. The East European Communist picked up where Stalin had left off, and wielded the term even more damagingly.

● 661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."¹⁹ His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

[665] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices — going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.²⁰

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. The Economic Strategy of Collectivization

423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

¹⁹ *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.

²⁰ *Scanteia* (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

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The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

- 661 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of
423 agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas—tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the pattern differed from one country to another—they could not solve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls. 661 ● 423

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical “fractionalization” represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled “kulak,” adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends. 423 311

4. The Strategy Unfolded

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equaling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant
668 resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the conflict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.¹⁸

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization
661 precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

¹⁸ Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY



648 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui
661 voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern European countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands; put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichschaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

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661 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czecho-
728 slovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

642 by a parliamentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties
 ● 661 and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were
 728 suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not
 unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers
 and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant
 Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923.
 The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could
 boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture.
 The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce,
 as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was
 open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no
 accident that in only one out of the many national elections
 held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the govern-
 ment that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections
 fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity
 of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this
 corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda
 Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high
 officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National
 minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from
 official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooli-
 ganism organised by government agents. The alliance with
 Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many
 of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse
 of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the
 overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who
 hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social
 order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous,
 independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the
 Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass
 activity.

Bulgaria

669 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists
 642 *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's
 728 tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers'
 militia. Local committees took over the administration and the
 red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was
 equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of
 October 7th, 1944, could write:

728 for the maintenance of private property, Immediately after its
642 establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the
669 Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which
I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically
denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist
regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the
government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in
the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 A few months later, at the national congress of the Father-
471 land Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader de-
clared: 'We are building a democractic country based on
private property and private initiative. Consequently the
Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely
attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed
the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a
completely Communist government.' An article in the official
paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March,
1945) described the programme of the Front in these words:
'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants,
craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individ-
uals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a
congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th,
1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf
of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be
handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive
it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all
work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year
later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov,
declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of
Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the
consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentary
system.'

642 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland
661 Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev
who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-
fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens
of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was
also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the
immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of
Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their 661
 illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in 642
 the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th
 September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the
 Government suggests that the group that has now taken over
 in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a
coup d'état in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very
 important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls
 the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The
 Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League
 in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any
 workers who demanded an improvement in their condition,
 or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the
 direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from
 Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far
 to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who
 demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail
 or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently
 made similar demands were publicly denounced by the
 Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful
 of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were
 castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Com-
 munist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from 661
 the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly 728
 as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because
 Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere
 proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-
 American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many
 members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over
 from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and
 the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly
 on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September,
 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Imprator*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934
 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'état* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the
 night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and
 a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*,
 a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup
 also played a leading role in the 1923 coup'. (*Imprator*, 1st June, 1934). Now the
 official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words:
 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations
 between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

- 661 the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were con-
728 demned to death and executed and another few thousands
sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

- 728 Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries
642 reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its
intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On
April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government
declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of
Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in
Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of
Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities
and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

- 728 Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December
642 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led
661 by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be
murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection
in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the
leadership of Tătărescu, who is now the Minister for Trade and

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Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed.

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'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.'

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Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

642 Groza⁴ repeatedly stated that his government was against
471 any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: '... the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital ... (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

642 Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with
661 Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist
1 [Premier of Rumania since March, 1945—Analyst]

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West!

Tătărescu did not hesitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finanțe și Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from 'A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War' published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Française* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of

CHAPTER III
YUGOSLAVIA—
THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE



UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators. 668

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an 563 668 661 ●

- 563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
 668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
 ● 661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this com-
 munal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats,
 Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or
 Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
 668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for
 a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under
 the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active
 part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović
 himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat
 capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated
 propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was
 reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin,
 Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old
 centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented
 the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official.
 Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and
 so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans
 and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
 186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
 563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted
 the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced
 Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution
 proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the
 liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all
 communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem
 pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Com-
 munist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different
 peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović
 (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of
 the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December,
 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian
 and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of
 Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the
 fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Mon-
 tenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY



AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited. 661
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The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the 661
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66/ Minister of Foreign Trade in Czechoslovakia until February, 1948, and who is now in exile. He states that on the eve of the Communist coup of February 'All the important posts in the Ministry of the Interior were occupied by Communists; in the division of the security police, of nine departmental heads, five were Communists. At the head of the three branches of the Corps of National Security Police (S.N.B.) there were only militant Communists: Colonel Krystof, Dr. Hora and Dr. Goerner. In one of the particularly important sections of the security police (Section III-2), of nineteen officers, fourteen were Communists. In the directing office of the Corps of the National Security Police, of thirteen officers, nine were Communists. At Central headquarters of the political police, the three chief posts were in Communist hands. In the intelligence services the Communists dominated, even in the lower ranks. In the Prague headquarters of the provincial S.N.B., of five high officers, four were members of the Communist Party. Of seventeen regional directors of the S.N.B. in Bohemia, twelve were Communists. Of a total of seventy high officers of the S.N.B., about sixty were members of the Communist Party'. (*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, p. 195). In the other satellites, there is no doubt that the Communist infiltration into key positions in the police was even more thorough. It is an apt comment that Andr ssy Ut in Budapest, in which the dreaded headquarters of the Special Security Police is found, now bears instead the name of Stalin!

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701 A similar situation existed in the army. A symbol of the complete control of the Kremlin over the armies of the satellite countries was the appointment of the Soviet Army Marshal, Constantin Rokossovsky, as Polish Minister of National Defence (7th November, 1949) in place of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.* Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw when it was part of Russian Poland, but has had as much to do with Poland as the Irish-born Field-Marshal Montgomery with his native country. He became famous, or more exactly notorious, in Poland, at the time of the Warsaw uprising, as the commander

*Rola-Zymierski was one of the few of Pilsudski's Legionnaires who took an oath of allegiance to the Germans in World War I. He was a commander of the Polish Army in the war against Russia in 1920. In 1927 he was tried and convicted on a charge of bribery, degraded, cashiered and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Kremlin raised him to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces and Minister of National Defence.

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of the Russian armies which passively looked on while the Nazis massacred the rebels. After the war he was groomed for command of the Polish Army by being kept in Poland as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops guarding Russia's lines of communication with the Soviet Zone of Germany. 66/●
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The Chief of Staff of the Polish Army, General Korczyz, and the Vice-Minister of Defence, General Poplawski, are also former commanders of the Soviet Army. On April 24th, 1950, the emigre Hungarian Communist monthly *Magyar Kommunista* reported that Soviet Commander General Mensikov, had been appointed 'Supervisor of the Hungarian Army.'

Besides controlling the 'national' armies the Kremlin keeps troops in four of the satellite countries, officially to protect the lines of communication leading to the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. These are Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. The only two countries with no Russian army are Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former, bordering on the U.S.S.R. and squeezed between Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Austria (with a short frontier with the American Zone of Germany) is from the military point of view well 'looked after'. In Yugoslavia, the non-existence of a Russian army and the fact that there is no frontier with the U.S.S.R. were of no small importance in the daring revolt of Tito against the Kremlin.

Secure in their control over army and police, the Communists could proceed to the elimination of all other parties. $\frac{1}{2}$
 $\frac{1}{2}$ [See category 116, pp. 160 - 182 -- Analyst]

little doubt that if war had not threatened, the struggles of the peasants and workers would have resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime. 665

In Bulgaria the peasant party—the Agrarian Union—took many years to recover from the overthrow of Stamboliisky in 1923. The majority of its leaders were either assassinated or forced into exile and it was not until 1933 that the government, in response to popular pressure, allowed the uncompromising Agrarian leaders to return. Opposition developed between the right wing Agrarian leaders such as Dimitar Gitchev and Alexander Obbov who were ready to collaborate with the Government, and the left wing Agrarians, the most important of whom were G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov. Because of their radicalism, these two were called 'fellow-travellers' of the Communist Party. The *Central European Observer* of 12th January, 1945, wrote of their party that it 'has always made friendship with Russia and Yugoslavia its chief aim.' (See also *International Press Correspondence* of November 13th, 1937, praising G. M. Dimitrov as the leader of the left wing of the Agrarian League, the 'Pladne' group, called after its paper).*

There were two other very small radical peasant groups, the Hungarian 'village explorers' (now united in the National Peasant Party) and the Rumanian Ploughmen's Front.

Without taking into account the internal contradiction in the peasant parties between their progressive, democratic and reactionary chauvinistic elements and the consequent splits, it is impossible to understand how the Communist Parties destroyed such big movements so easily and quickly.

An important feature of the Communist Party policy towards the peasant parties was that of 'divide and rule.' They split each peasant party into different wings, so that they could play one off against the other. The Communists did not necessarily co-operate with the more progressive and democratic group against the other. Their policy was determined solely by expediency and not principle. For instance, in Bulgaria, 661 ●

*Ten years later the Communist-controlled Agrarian Union paper, *Zemdeltski Zname* wrote: Nikola Petkov 'In 1931 belonged to the agrarian "Pladne" group, whose connections with foreign reactionary circles were all too well known. (Quoted in *Free Bulgaria*, 1st October, 1947). It seems it was only to *International Press Correspondence* that this was not well known.

- 66/ Nikola Petkov* was very popular, and so could be more independent than the Communist Party liked. This objection did not apply to Kimon Georgiev, who, as stated above, was one of the leaders of the 1923 and 1934 *coups* and, after 9th September, 1944, was an influential member of the Bulgarian Government. Similarly Obbov, the leader of the right wing of the Agrarian Union, was so unpopular as a reactionary that the Communist Party felt safe in establishing around him a National Agrarian Union. To have some idea of how restricted was the popularity of Obbov and Co. compared with that of Petkov, we need but compare the circulation of the official paper of the Agrarian Union *Zemedelsko Zname* with the paper of the Opposition Agrarian Union *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*: on November 1st, 1945, the circulation of the former in Sofia was 1,900 copies, and of the latter 35,250 copies. To 'ally' with the publishers of *Zemedelsko Zname* rather than with those of *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname* was therefore more convenient for the Communist leaders. (Of course, when this 'coalition' ceased to be necessary for Moscow's agents, it could easily be dismissed; and since December, 1947, Obbov has disappeared from public life and according to repeated rumours is under house arrest).

Black as his record was, Maniu was a progressive and consistent democrat compared with Tătărescu. To prove this, Maniu had only to quote some of the declarations of the Rumanian Communist Party before the war, such as that of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania, on November 18th, 1937:

'The Tătărescu Government is a Government hostile to the people and hated not only by the masses of the workers and peasants but also by great sections of the middle class. Its domestic policy, consisting in a fascist transformation of the country coupled with the starvation of the masses and its foreign policy, consisting in preparation for war and for a gradual steering of Rumania into the wake of Hitler Germany, have given rise to considerable discontent among the broad masses of all sections of the population.'

'In consideration of the growing menace of fascism and war, the *Communist Party of Rumania* again appeals to all democratic

*Nikola Petkov's brother, Petko Petkov, a minister in Stamboliisky's government and after the latter's assassination the general secretary of the Agrarian League, was murdered in 1924 by Georgiev's supporters.

parties and organisations to concentrate all forces for the mobilisation of the masses. The Party appeals to the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and all other working-class organisations to bring about immediately unity of action and trade union unity. The Party appeals to all democratic forces of Rumania to act in concert for the immediate mobilisation of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the labouring masses of the Rumanian people and of all other nations living in Rumania in order to prevent the interference of Nazi Germany in the internal affairs of Rumania, in order to achieve the dissolution of all Nazi agencies in Rumania (the fascist and Trotskyist parties and organisations), the prohibition of their propaganda and the arrest of their leaders, and in order to set up in place of the pro-fascist Tătărescu Government a government which would adopt the slogan "for peace, liberty, bread and land" and would unite all democratic parties and organisations with the national Zaranist Party (Maniu's Party—Y.G.) in the lead.' (*International Press Correspondence*, 27th November, 1937). 661

In defending himself against the Communist Party's attack, 208 Maniu tried to quote such statements as this, but of course the Communist-controlled censorship and police were on the alert. 661 On January, 1946, the censor of the Russian Occupation Authorities struck out an item in the Opposition paper *Ardealul* which gave a verbatim quotation from the 1938 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* in which Maniu's party was described as anti-Fascist, democratic and pro-Soviet. (*Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1946). The Communists obviously could not allow Maniu to quote what they had repeatedly said about him in the years 1936-39. Now the slogan of their alliance with Tătărescu in the General Elections of 1946 (which allotted 75 seats in the new Parliament to Tătărescu's party as against 68 to the Communists) was: 'Do not vote for Maniu, who shot the workers in 1933.'

When the Russian Army entered Poland, a group headed 661 by Andrzej Witos, Władysław Kowalski, Wincenty Baranowski, Antoni Korzycki, Józef Putek, Bronisław Drzewiecki and Stanisław Banczyk proclaimed themselves the leaders of Stronnictwo Ludowe, (S.L.), the Peasant Party. Some of them, like Kowalski, Korzycki, or Baranowski were simply Communists in

- 661 disguise. Banczyk left the group at the end of 1945 when Mikolajczyk, the genuine leader of the S.L., came to Poland, and he joined Mikolajczyk's new Party. The choice of Andrzej Witos to be the Chairman of the S.L. was a clever step from the Kremlin's point of view. He was the brother of the old popular Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos. He had been a member of the Peasant Party 'Piast'. When he was expelled from the party in 1928 he joined the 'Colonels', who suppressed the movement of the workers and peasants and condemned Wincenty Witos to a long period of exile. After a time, when it became clear that the peasants did not fall for the trick, and recognized the difference between the two brothers, Andrzej Witos was dropped from the S.L. leadership. To assure success to Kowalski and his friends, the authentic leadership of the old S.L. had to be removed from any political activity. Consequently the Soviet Army arrested the General Secretary of the real Peasant Party, Kazimierz Baginski, and two members of its Central Council, Stanislaw Mierzwa and Adam Bien; Baginski and Mierzwa belonged to the left wing of the Party. They were later released after having obviously been ill-treated in prison. But the threat of arrest still hung over the heads of the real leaders of the Peasant Party. When Mikolajczyk was allowed to come back to Poland (the Kremlin had to keep up an appearance of 'democracy'), he organised the old Peasant Party under the name 'Polish Peasant Party'—P.S.L. In a short time, the Party had hundreds of thousands of members and its strength was revealed in the general elections of January, 1947: In preparation for the election, the Polish security police (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, headed by the Communist official, Stanislaw Radkiewicz) arrested tens of thousands of P.S.L. supporters. In Cracow alone, for instance 15,000 P.S.L. supporters were arrested on January 18th and released on January 19th, too late to vote. Of 864 P.S.L. candidates only 428 were allowed to stand. At 97 per cent of all the polling stations—6,430 out of 6,726—the P.S.L. was not allowed any representatives. Of the 296 polling stations which admitted scrutineers from the P.S.L., in only 35 were they allowed to be present at the count itself; at these 35 the official results gave the P.S.L. 62 per cent of the votes and the Government bloc 38 per cent.* When

*For a full report on the elections see L. M. Oak's articles in the American weekly *New Leader* of February 15th and 22nd, 1947.

this failed to break the morale of the P.S.L., the security police began to arrest more and more regional leaders of the Party. Mikolajczyk had to flee the country, and the P.S.L. offices and papers were transferred to the subservient S.L. which could thus declare, without fear of opposition, that there was a 'unanimous' will in the two parties for fusion.*

The liquidation of the P.S.L. was not a difficult task for the Kremlin's agents, as the P.S.L. had the characteristics of the other peasant parties mentioned above which made it an easy prey for anyone seeking its destruction—the atomisation of the peasantry, its dispersal in small villages, its lack of a positive programme after the land reform was instituted, the influence of the division of the peasantry into different and antagonistic layers, etc. In its hopelessness the P.S.L. resorted to opportunism. This was illustrated by the position it took in a referendum held on 28th July, 1946. The Communist leaders decided to put three issues before the country aiming at a demonstration of unity: the abolition of the Second Chamber (Senate), the land reform and nationalisation and the new western frontier. Mikolajczyk called upon his supporters to approve the second and third issues, but to vote against the first. The peasant movement had always been against a Second Chamber, and it was the sheer opportunism of 'Realpolitik' which made Mikolajczyk flout the tradition of the movement. The same opportunism revealed itself in another, much more dangerous tendency, a readiness to accept the support of fascists and semi-fascists who opposed the Communists and looked for a legal framework for their activity. The P.S.L. was not very much strengthened by this, and it lost many of its more progressive supporters among the peasantry, the intellectuals, and of course the workers, because of it. Its disintegration was facilitated by such policies.

In Hungary the once powerful Smallholders' Party which in the general elections of November, 1945, won 59 per cent of all the votes, was transformed by 'purges', arrests and suppression of free speech at meetings and in the press, into a mere sham of a party. The spurious character of the present Smallholders' Party is most clearly revealed by the fact that

*For very detailed reports on the regimentation of the Polish Peasant Party see the series of articles of A. Rudziński in the American weekly *Labor Action*.

- 661 although the present Prime Minister is a member of this party, he is rarely mentioned in the Hungarian press and his name, István Dóbi, is hardly known to the people.

The peasant parties of Yugoslavia, which in the past were very strong, apparently exist officially even today, but none of them has a daily, weekly, or any other paper and none of them is represented in Parliament. Their last representative was Dragoljub Jovanović, whose record included years of imprisonment under King Alexander's dictatorship. He was a secretary of the People's Front and a Minister in Tito's Government. But how could Tito forgive him when he declared in Parliament: 'The Communists are wonderful. They liberated us from the King and the Church; it only remains for them to liberate us from the Communist Party'? He was immediately expelled from the Government, from the People's Front, from his own Serbian Peasant Party and from his position as a professor at the University of Belgrade. Thus he became the one-man opposition to the Government in Parliament. But Tito could not tolerate any dissentient voice and steps were taken to close his mouth. In February, 1947, he was beaten up and severely wounded by hooligans. (The Yugoslav press did not mention this incident). Immediately afterwards he was tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The fate of Stalin's quislings in the sham peasant parties was often grim. Thus, for instance, Romulus Zăroni, Minister of Agriculture in the first Groza Government, and Moga and Belea, the people who had led the Ploughman's Front since its foundation in 1934 in South Transylvania, when it was a small organisation with genuine peasant support at least locally, were removed from any positions they held after Moscow found they had served their purpose. The two most prominent leaders of the Hungarian 'village explorers' (after the war renamed the National Peasant Party) were Imre Kovács and Péter Veres: the former resigned his post as General Secretary and succeeded in escaping abroad; the latter was driven out of public life.

- 687 The important part played by the Communist-controlled
- 625 police in the liquidation of the peasant parties not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other 'People's Democracies' is clear from the following testimony of Peter Koev, an M.P. and a

CHAPTER VI

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES



BEFORE THEIR LIQUIDATION by the Communist Parties, the 665
different Socialist Parties of Eastern Europe varied greatly in
strength, both absolutely and relatively to the national Com-
munist Parties. The Polish Socialist Party was incomparably
stronger than its Communist rival; the Hungarian Socialist
Party was much stronger than the Communist Party; in
Rumania they were of about equal strength; in Czechoslovakia
the Socialist Party was much weaker than the Communist
Party and in Bulgaria it was weaker still; in Yugoslavia a
Socialist Party scarcely existed. It is, therefore, most instructive
to examine in detail the fight of Moscow against the Polish
Socialist Party, while referring only briefly to the fate of the
Socialist Parties in the other countries.

For various reasons the Communist Party of Poland (K.P.P.) 661
was never as strong as the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) The fore-665
runner of the K.P.P. was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom
of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.i.L.) whose founder and
teacher was Rosa Luxemburg. This great Marxist thinker had
one very mistaken conception which proved to be a serious
impediment to the Polish Party, this was her opposition to any
fight for Poland's independence from Russia, Germany and
Austria. The ill-fated invasion of the Red Army in 1920
further convinced the masses that the K.P.P. was indifferent
to Poland's independence. Karl Radek, who knew Poland
well, told the Bolshevik leaders that the Red Army's advance
on Warsaw would only isolate the K.P.P. and advised against
it. Although he was supported by Trotsky, his warning was
ignored by the Bolshevik Party leadership. This was an
important cause of the failure of the K.P.P. to gain the support
of the majority of the Polish workers. Since the S.D.K.P.i.L.

661 was older than the Russian Social Democracy, and hence older
 665 than the Bolshevik Party which was originally a faction of the
 Russian Social Democracy, it had traditions of independent
 thought that inevitably clashed with the rising absolutist
 bureaucracy in Russia. In 1923 the majority of the Central
 Committee of the K.P.P. supported Trotsky against Stalin in
 the internal Party fight, and after his triumph, Stalin
 liquidated the Luxemburgist-Trotskyist leadership. Later he
 had to liquidate the supporters of Bukharin, the President of
 the Comintern. Later still even the new leadership of the K.P.P.
 appointed in 1930, did not conform to the 'Line' and had to be
 liquidated. As Poland lay on the Russian border and the
 K.P.P. was illegal, the most important leaders of the Party
 were usually in U.S.S.R., and were thus involved in the big
 purges of the thirties. Many of them were executed or perished
 in forced labour camps—Domski, Sofia Unschlicht, Warski-
 Warszawski, Kostrzewa-Koszutska, Prochniak, Huberman
 (brother of the violinist), Winiarski, Sochacki, Lenski, Rval,
 Zarski, Wandurski and Jasienski. (For full details of the fate of
 the Polish Communist leaders in Russia see the article of
 P. Olchowski in *Narodnaya Pravda*, Paris, September, 1950).
 Apparently the purge so decimated the K.P.P. leadership that
 the Russians found it necessary officially to dissolve the Party
 (1938). (Their excuse that a large number of police spies had in-
 000 filtrated into the Party would have been a reason for reorganis-
 ing, not abolishing it). Shortly after the liquidation of the K.P.P.
 an event occurred which made any Kremlin supporter hateful
 to the Poles—the Stalin-Hitler Pact which laid Poland open
 to invasion. No Pole could forget Molotov's glee when he said
 before the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, 1939: 'Instead of
 the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European
 powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment
 of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany . . .
 One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then
 by the Red Army, and nothing was left of the ugly offspring of
 the Versailles Treaty . . . ' Nor could any Pole forget or forgive
 Molotov's message to the German ambassador in Moscow at
 the end of the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia:
 'I have received your communication regarding the entry of
 German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations

668 The war was a great test of strength, moral and physical, for the P.P.S. The Party was mainly responsible for the decision to defend encircled Warsaw in September, 1939. The 'Colonels' recognised this and their spokesman said: 'The workers' defence smacks of socialist revolution'. Having had long experience in illegal work since the time of Tsarism, the P.P.S. quickly accommodated itself to the new conditions of struggle under the German heel. For conspiratorial purposes, the Party adopted the name 'The Movement of the Working Masses of Poland', and was generally called the W.R.N. from the initial letters of its slogan: 'Freedom (Wolność) Equality (Równość) Independence (Niepodległość)'. The following quotation describes the activity of the W.R.N. under the German occupation: '... a large secret organisational network of the W.R.N. comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2,000 units. The underground Socialist Press and pamphlets reached, in the course of the war, the amazing figure of 2 million copies. A Socialist military organisation was created under the name of O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments), which was included, as a separate and distinct organisation, in the national scheme of the Underground Home Army (A.K.). There was, besides, a Socialist Militia, organised both on a territorial and on a factory basis. All these organisations played an outstanding role, *inter alia* in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.' (A. Ciolkosz, *The Expropriation of a Socialist Party*, New York, September-October, 1946, p.3). The price paid by the P.P.S. for this resistance to the German occupation was high. 'Notwithstanding the strict observance of all conspiratorial rules—in which the P.P.S., owing to her old revolutionary tradition excelled anyone else—heavy losses could not be avoided. Three members of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (Niedziałkowski, Czapiński, Topinek) and 28 other members of the Supreme Council of the Party, perished at the hands of the invaders. Altogether about 700 prominent leaders of the Party met their death under the occupation. From these figures the losses amongst the rank and file can be imagined.' (Ibid. p. 4).

661 When the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1944, one of the main objectives of the Russians was to destroy the P.P.S. and, to achieve this, they used the same technique as they used [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

against the Peasant Party. While the major part of Poland 661 was still under German occupation, a congress was held at Lublin, in the Russian Zone of Occupation on 10-11th September, 1944, which called itself the 25th Congress of the P.P.S. A new Party executive was elected. Edward Osubka-Morawski was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Boleslaw Drobner Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party, and Stefan Matuszewski, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Their friends filled the other places in the leading committees. Osubka-Morawski became Chairman of the Lublin Committee and afterwards of the Provisional Polish Government in the name of the P.P.S.

But the credentials of Osubka-Morawski and his friends were forged. Before the war Osubka-Morawski was a minor co-operative official and a member of the P.P.S. but by no means one of its leaders. During the war, he left the P.P.S. and joined a tiny new group called Polish Socialist Workers' Party (R.P.P.S.). Drobner joined the P.P.S.—after having been excluded from it in 1936—on the same day as he was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party. In the so-called 25th Congress of the P.P.S. there was not one member of the authentic Central Executive Committee or the Supreme Council of the Party and not one Socialist member of the former Polish Parliaments.

The leaders of the authentic P.P.S. were prevented from claiming their right to reconstitute the Party or from building a new party. Instead they were cruelly persecuted. The General Secretary of the old P.P.S., Kazimierz Puzak, had given a lifetime of service to the Party. He joined it in 1903. In 1911 a Tsarist court condemned him to eight years' hard labour to be followed by lifelong exile in Siberia; he spent six years in irons and in solitary confinement in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, the most notorious of all the Tsarist prisons. He was released in March, 1917, by the Russian Revolution and became General Secretary of the P.P.S. in 1921. During the war he was chairman of the Underground Parliament, and thus one of the main leaders of the Resistance. Later he was arrested by the Russian Army, released, and then re-arrested; he died in prison in April, 1950. Antoni Zdanowski was a prominent leader of the P.P.S. between the wars, was Assistant

- 66/ General Secretary of the Polish T.U.C. and editor of its paper. He too was a leader of the resistance movement during the war, and in spite of Osubka-Morawski and the P.P.R. was elected chairman of the Warsaw official P.P.S. Council in 1945 by the members of the Warsaw branch of the official P.P.S. After leaving the official P.P.S., he was arrested and was eventually murdered in prison. Cohn, another leader of the P.P.S., who was for six years in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was once more imprisoned. The same fate has befallen Antoni Pajdak, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Josef Dziegielewski, Wiktor Krawczyk, Wladyslaw Wilczynski, Stanislaw Sobolewski, Adam Obarski, Boleslaw Galaj and others. One of the most popular P.P.S. leaders was Zygmunt Zulawski, leader of the Party for forty years, for many years the chairman of its Supreme Council and General Secretary of the T.U.C. To keep up the appearance of democracy, the P.P.R. leaders allowed him to become a member of Parliament while preventing all his friends from standing for election as Independent Socialists. Single handed he fought a bitter struggle till his death in September 1949.

465 But even after the elimination of the real P.P.S., the official P.P.S. was a threat to the P.P.R., since of the two, the Polish workers preferred the former. For example, in 63 elections to shop committees held at the end of 1945 in the largest industrial district of Poland, out of a total of 928 seats the P.P.R. gained only 193 (21 per cent) while the Socialists gained 556 (64 per cent); the rest were divided thus: official trade union common lists of P.P.S. and P.P.R., 117 (12.6 per cent); Democratic Party, 14; Christian Labour Party, 10; Polish Peasant Party, 2; others (non-party), 36.* In many cases even members of the P.P.R. did not vote for their Party lists in the shop committee elections. This is clear from the complaint made on December 8th, 1945, by Gomulka, then General Secretary of the P.P.R.: 'There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "Fablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250—270 people. And in these elections we have not gained a single seat'. If people join a party from fear of being victimised, they will take the first opportunity of showing their real attitude to it.

*For particulars see *Robotnik Polski*, London, January, 1946.

In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, ⁶⁶⁵ Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre-^[467]war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's ⁶⁶⁵ temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and immediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz. ⁶⁶¹

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

two parties. It also acted; in all factories, members of the P.P.S. who opposed fusion began to be 'purged'. On 7th May, Adam Kurylowicz, a member of the P.P.S. who had been General Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1947, and previously, from 1918 to 1939, President of the All-Polish Railway Workers' Union, wrote an article in *Robotnik* called 'The Defence of the Workers against Abuses and Arbitrary Measures', in which he accused the P.P.R. of setting up a regime of terror in the factories. 'From all parts of the country, he wrote, 'fresh reports keep coming of injustices suffered by the workers. The elements alien to the working class behave in arbitrary fashion, and act "like bosses". They fire and hire workers without taking into account the opinion of the workers of the plant, scorning the laws, conquests, and social rights of the workers. A clique of self-seeking politicians is being formed. These new dignitaries have discovered that a party book is more important than technical qualifications'.

The reply to the impertinence of the P.P.S. was a political trial staged by the security police. One of the defendants, accused of membership of W.R.N., 'confessed' that there were 'no actual differences between the W.R.N. and the (official) Socialist Party'. The threat to the official P.P.S. was all too clear, and although the Party Congress of 14-17 December, 1947, did not welcome the P.P.R. call for a merger, the P.P.S. leadership knew that the game was up and on March 17th, 1948, Cyrankiewicz declared that the merger would be carried out. 82,000 members of the P.P.S. out of the total of 800,000 were expelled from the Party and many of the recalcitrant leaders were removed. Kurylowicz was removed from his post as General Secretary of the trade unions and replaced by Tadeusz Cwik, an old Communist Party agent. Rusinek, Osibka-Morawski, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members were removed from the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Szwabbe and another eleven members were removed from the Supreme Council (meeting of the P.P.S. National Council, Warsaw, September 18-22, 1948). The whole executive committee of the P.P.S. in Lodz was removed and other local committees followed suit. The heresy-hunting of Gomulka* occurred at the same time, and

* See pp. 281-3.

this increased the opposition of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. to unity with the dictatorial P.P.R. and also led to more stringent measures against oppositionists. But by December, 1948, the fusion was an accomplished fact and the 'United Polish Workers' Party' (Z.P.P.R.) was born. The quisling Cyrankiewicz said of the Unity Congress: 'This congress is the greatest event in Poland since Kościuszko's rising'. Cyrankiewicz is probably thus aspiring to get from Stalin the Order of Suvorov—the hangman of Kościuszko's rising!

The liquidation of the Socialist Parties in the other satellites followed a roughly similar course. But because these Socialist Parties were relatively weaker than the Polish Socialist Party, their collapse was due not only to police pressure and the presence in some of them of Russian armies, but to the feeling of many of the rank and file members that the parties were not strong enough to stand up to the pressure of the Communist Parties without allying with the bourgeoisie, and yet that such an alliance would be too dangerous, because a victory of the bourgeoisie over the Communist Parties which had the support of the majority of the workers, would lead to a defeat of the workers themselves and a bourgeois terroristic dictatorship, in short to fascism. The members of the P.P.S. felt confident that if it were not for the Russian army of occupation, they could get rid of the Communist Party dictatorship, and suppress any fascist elements. But many socialists in the other satellite countries thought it would be impossible to oppose at one and the same time the Communist Party dictatorship and a nascent fascist dictatorship. Hence there were different tendencies within the Socialist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—on the one hand, the followers of right wing conservative leaders like Károly Peyer, Kosta Lulchev or C. Titel Petrescu, who collaborated with the bourgeois parties, on the other, those who worked with the Communist Party under such leaders as Zdeněk Fierlinger, Árpád Szakasits and Dimitri Neikov.* The third tendency,

*The fate of these 'fellow-travellers' in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria was not better than that of Osóbka-Morawski and Co. in Poland. After they had served their purpose they were pushed aside. Fierlinger, who had been given the post of Vice-Premier as a reward for his services in the February coup, was on April 25th, 1950, relegated to the Ministry of Church Affairs. Szakasits on April 24th, resigned his post as President of the Hungarian Republic on the

- 661 favouring an independent socialist policy, which predominated in the P.P.S., was very weak in the other Socialist Parties.
- 665 The greater the feeling of impotence, the weaker was this wing.

661 The Communist Party leaders did their best to identify every opposition to themselves with resurgent fascism. This was not difficult, as remnants of the fascist bourgeoisie existed and it was always possible either to reveal or invent a fascist plot. The secret police can always keep in reserve some of the 'lunatic' fringe of fascists in order to use them at a suitable moment.

The knowledge that the Kremlin would not abdicate its authority without using all the forces at its disposal, the belief that the people of the satellites themselves could not put up a successful opposition, the conviction that their 'liberation' in a Third World War would mean in reality the destruction of the population and civilization, all these factors contributed to produce a feeling of hopelessness, and hence capitulation.

This was particularly true of the serious and thoughtful workers in the Socialist Parties. The Communist leaders are well aware of this and not only rely on the demonstration of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but play on the real fear of war.

- 665 After years of pressure on all sides from Moscow agents of the Kremlin, there is not one Socialist Party today in the whole of Eastern Europe. All of them have been merged with the Communist Parties.

grounds of ill-health; this looks very much like an excuse as a fortnight later his son-in-law, Deputy Paul Schiffer, was expelled from Parliament. Neikov had better luck; he died on February 16th, 1948. (At the time of his death he held a relatively unimportant position, that of Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly). The fate of other 'fellow-travellers' was also grim. Thus for instance in Hungary György Marosán, Deputy Secretary of the united Party and Minister of Light Industry, disappeared during a visit to Russia (his resignation was announced on August 5, 1950); Istvan Riesz, a former Social Democrat and Minister of Justice, was arrested in June, 1950, and died in prison; Pál Justus, a former Social Democrat and member of the Central Committee of the united Party, was condemned to imprisonment for life at the Rajk Trial. Similar cases from the other 'People's Democracies' can be quoted by the dozen.

CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON



ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is 'among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.'

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The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while 'national unity' and 'order' were maintained. The inhuman expulsion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

Number of Germans Expelled

167 R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in
 563 *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following sum-
 661 mary of the expulsion of Germans:

<i>Country of Permanent Residence</i>	<i>Number Involved</i>	<i>Statistical Source</i>
East Prussia	2,333,301	<i>Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, census for 1933.</i>
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total 9,278,545		
German minorities in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	<i>I.L.O., Displacement of Population in Europe p. 38 Polish census, 1921.</i>
Occupied Eastern Territories ..	300,000	
German minority in Poland ..	1,059,000	
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	<i>I.L.O., Displacement of Population in Europe, p. 38 Czechoslovakian census, 1930.</i>
Sudeten	3,231,688	
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	<i>Hungarian census, 1920. Royal Inst. of International Affairs, South-Eastern Europe. p. 8.</i>
Rumania	740,000	
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total 17,062,716		

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

total number of foreign workers in Germany, including 167 prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.) (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2-3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305). 563 661 ●

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million. 162

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:— 565

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war 464 preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the 668 banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62-3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet 563 adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed 661 Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with 668 their families made up 700-800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', 000 who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party ¹⁸⁶ discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the ⁶⁶¹ Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses ⁵²³ could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecký, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedlý, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts*, and we are in the position to do so *because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army*. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide *either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people. We belong to the great* ¹/_A [See category 116, p. 183 -- Analyst]

- 186 Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands
 ● 661 with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he
 563 goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . 'Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the 186
Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of 661
Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary 563
of the Party, was responsible).

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of 466
thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from 611
the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory 563
labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school.

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in 563
Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national 661
animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne*. It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German.

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

563 authorities, trying now to win the ear of the German people,
 661 attacked Ilya Ehrenburg for his extremely vicious propaganda
 against the Germans (*Pravda*, April 14th, 1945). A contradiction? It is easy enough to wriggle out of contradictions by singing different songs in different languages and in different countries. For those Germans who were interested in the fate of their brethren in Czechoslovakia, there was a ready answer: all the Sudeten Germans were responsible for the Henlein movement! Thus, for instance, P. Reimann wrote on 2nd June, 1945: 'A German anti-fascist movement in Czechoslovakia does not exist. There were in the best case in Czechoslovakia individual people of German origin who, separated from any movement in the German population, as individuals supported the Czech national liberatory movement.' 'That also earlier layers of the working class organised by the Socialists were intoxicated by the Nazis *proves* the news in the British press of the mass flight of the German miners from Brütz region. The conception that the German working class were not an exception to the general development of the German minority under the Nazi regime is by this and similar news to our sorrow confirmed.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945). This appeared in *Einheit*, whose sub-title is 'Sudeten German anti-Fascist Fortnightly', and which for years gave out that the Communist Party had considerable influence in the anti-Nazi movement in Sudetenland. As late as 22nd May, 1945, *Einheit* published a letter from a Czech soldier who visited a German glass factory near Pilsen, saying: ' . . . we can be proud. Our people and those who were before Social Democratic functionaries—all of them, notwithstanding the terror, have held through and followed our thoughts, and all of them said to me that they waited for our return with gladness. What we built they defended and will continue to defend.' *Einheit* soon forgot this. The Communist Party policy in Czechoslovakia was now unequivocal: there was no place for Germans there. From now on any mention of the speeches given over Radio Moscow to the Sudeten Germans is betrayal of the Party line.

After the war, the Communist Party made out not only that all the Sudeten Germans—except for a few isolated individuals—were Nazis, but that they became Nazis despite the fact that

in the Czechoslovak Republic they enjoyed full equality with other citizens. Gustav Beuer, a former Communist Party Deputy from Sudetenland, wrote: '... the treatment of the German minority by the Republic (of 1918-1938—Y.G.) as a whole was such as to make it possible for the Germans to adapt themselves to the new conditions and to become part and parcel of the Slav country had it not been for their deeply-rooted hostility toward everything Slav.' (*New Czechoslovakia and her Historical Background*, London, 1947, pp.190-1). This is directly contrary to all the Communist Party had been saying for more than fifteen years about the injustice meted out to the Germans in Czechoslovakia.*

The expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia cannot be explained as the result of the people's spontaneous hatred. The majority of the Slovaks, who are not Teutons but Slavs, supported Tiso, Nazi puppet ruler of Slovakia, no less readily than the majority of the Germans supported Henlein. The number of Slovak political prisoners who died in Nazi concentration camps was smaller than that of the Sudeten Germans, and there were relatively fewer victims even among the Czechs.†

The Czechs suffered much less than the Yugoslavs under the Nazi occupation. 1,700,000 of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia died under the German occupation, while 200 thousand (of whom more than 100,000 were Jews) died in Czechoslovakia. The crimes of the Sudetan fascists against the Czechs and Slovaks reveal far less savagery than the crimes of the Croat Ustashe who murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, men, women and children. Yet, in Yugoslavia, as we have seen,

*See the quotation from *International Press Correspondence* of 1st June, 1935, quoted above. Or to take another example, on 13th November, 1933, the Communist Party group in the French parliament refused to associate itself with the tributes paid by the French Government on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic: 'No, we do not associate ourselves with your manifestation of sympathy addressed to the Government of Czechoslovakia . . . We do not forget that at present the masters of this country hold national minorities under a yoke . . . All our sympathy goes to the labouring masses of Czechoslovakia, to the national minorities, Slovak, Jewish, German, Hungarian, oppressed by the central power of Prague.' (Quoted by Maurice Ceyrat, *La Trahison Permanente*, Paris, 1948, p. 25).

†By the way, it must not be forgotten that after the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the creation of Tiso's 'Independent Slovakia', the Kremlin closed the Czechoslovakian Legation in Moscow and appointed a Soviet delegate to Tiso's government.

563 national hatred and persecution of Germans was never a
 661 general feature of Communist Party policy, and for a period
 Tito's army even contained a unit of German anti-fascists.

Nor can the anti-German policy in Czechoslovakia be explained as the by-product of a resistance movement against the Nazis. A week before the occupation of Prague by the Russian Army there was no armed resistance among the Czechs (unlike the Slovaks) to the German occupation, and up to two or three days before the occupation Radio Prague, which was under German control, could boast of the fact that 'many Czechs are working for the defence of the Homeland' (i.e., working for the Germans). The conflict with the local German population did not occur until after the defeat of Germany. For many months, indeed for over a year, the Czech press repeatedly attacked the many Czechs in Sudetenland who were friendly to the Germans. All the evidence shows that the expulsion was imposed by the organised pressure of the Czech Communist Party and the bourgeoisie on a disoriented people.

In all two and a half million Germans whose ancestors had lived in the country for hundreds of years, were expelled from Czechoslovakia. Five hundred years after the popular democratic movement of Hus which united peasants, artisans and workers both Czech and German, more than twenty-five years after Lenin praised the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at one time the third biggest Communist Party (after the Russian and German Parties), which united the revolutionary workers, Czech and German, Slovak and Hungarian, there took place a terrible persecution of the Germans which can be compared in severity only to the persecution of the Jews by Hitler. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe the horrors of this persecution, which constitutes a vital part of the reactionary policy of the Communist Parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The following quotation from '*A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Foreign Secretaries of the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement from the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, 1st March, 1947*', gives a few examples of the sufferings inflicted on the Germans. The events in one small town—Saaz (Žatec) will be described. The population of Saaz in 1930 was 18,061.

Atrocities Committed Against the Sudeten Germans

'Arno Behrisch, a former Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in Saxony, collected the following facts from the famous hop-growing centre of Saaz in North-Western Bohemia. Behrisch was a refugee in Sweden during the war. He was imprisoned by the Swedish authorities for his part in pro-Allied activities. He now lives at Hof in Bavaria as socialist party secretary and is vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party. In 1945 and 1946, he and his wife, Hildegard Behrisch, interviewed many Sudeten refugees and the following report is the result of their investigations.

'On Sunday, June 3rd, 1945, the Czech authorities ordered all male Germans of Saaz between 13 and 63 years of age to appear in the market place at 6 a.m. Those who were late were terribly beaten up with whips, clubs and planks. Two men were shot at once because they ventured a protest. 5,000 men and boys were marched off to the neighbouring town of Pöstelberg, about 11 miles away. They had to march at a quick pace in the glowing sun and those who lagged behind were shot on the road. At Postelberg, the men were interned in an old cavalry barracks. They had to spend the night in the barrack-yard, lying flat on the ground. The Czech guards threatened to shoot anybody who would get up. Every hour the guards fired volleys over the rows of prostrate men. Czech guards walked among the men and beat those who stirred a little. At dawn a command in Czech was heard; it was not clearly understood, it could have meant *zůstat*, stay put, or *vstát*, get up. Some of the men got up, others remained on the ground. At once the guards opened fire and whole rows of the victims were mown down with tommy-guns. Those who were only wounded were finished off by a shot in the neck from behind.

'The next night, the men were herded into the stables. 400 men were locked up in a stable for 28 horses. Hundreds of men had to spend further nights in the barrack-yard. No food was given to the prisoners for the first three days; later they received a piece of bread and some potato soup. Again the guards shot men during the night and also in daylight. A German engineer was shot by a Czech soldier who shouted or all to hear: "This is the *coup de grace*, this will happen to all of

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563 you!" Other Czechs shouted: "Our doctor, our hospital, our
661 medicine is the shot in the neck!"

'On June 5th, the men were sorted out according to their political antecedents. Communists and former inmates of German concentration camps were sent back to Saaz. S.S.-men and Nazi political leaders, former policemen, etc. were driven back into the stables, some into a pig sty. Former German soldiers remained in the barrack-yard. The men locked up in the stables suffered from lack of fresh air. 10 men became hysterical, 50 fainted. When others shouted to the guards outside that there were some who had gone mad, the guards answered: "Kill them!" There were only two small openings in the wall for ventilation. When the prisoners asked to leave the door open for a while, the Czechs answered by shots through the holes in the wall. Several men died, some more were shot in the morning. In the stables, the troughs were filled with water. The prisoners had to dip their heads into them. When they could no longer stay with their faces under water and raised their heads, they were beaten on the neck.

'Day and night Czechs came to fetch some of the men out and beat them up. This happened practically every two hours. In this the soldiers were helped by civilians who brought sticks, clubs, whips and cables for the beatings. Several men were beaten to death.

'June 6th. A lorryload of Czechs with rubber truncheons and whips arrived and started an orgy of beatings in the worst S.S.-fashion. The German victims had to undress completely and were beaten terribly for a whole hour. The maltreatment lasted until they collapsed and fainted. Then they were revived with showers of cold water and the whipping of the bleeding men went on. Czechs smashed the genitals of some men by stamping on them with their boots. The cries of the tortured were frightful. Five boys, aged 13 to 16, were beaten murderously because they had moved a few steps from their place. The children groaned and yelled for their mothers. Then the five children were stood up against the wall and the Czechs raised their rifles. The boys cried: "Don't fire, let us live!" A volley was fired and the five boys fell to the ground. This was witnessed by thousands in the barrack-yard. What could have been the crime of these children?

'Then the Czechs started another sport, well-known in these concentration camps, that of making the prisoners mistreat each other. They were made to beat and beat each other and when they did it not thoroughly enough, they were beaten by the Czechs. Some were tortured by wooden spikes being driven under the finger-nails, others again by trampling on the genitals. One man was whipped on the genitals, so that of course the torturers tied a rope and pulled heavily. Furthermore they pressed with their hands the testicles of some victims until the men fainted from pain. A German chemist was shot in the evening.

'Of 300 ex-soldiers, driven into a small stable at night and ill-treated as already described, five men died the next night. Among them was a well-known anti-Nazi. The guards amused themselves by firing shots into the room. The cause of the riot was that they had been drafted into the German army.

'Gradually groups of prisoners were taken away. Some were sent to concentration camps, others to forced labour. The latter included well-known anti-Nazis and even half-Jews. A number of men were taken to nearby woods and shot. Finally, a number of men, among them Herr Kottmar, one of the witnesses, were marched back to Sasa on June 10th. On their way they were beaten without interruption. A Catholic priest was shot because he could not march fast enough.

'June 12th. The first transport of transferred people left here. They were selected for their inability to work. Among them was a number of invalids who were not allowed to take their artificial limbs with them. The transport consisted of one man and 800 women and children. All their belongings had been taken away from them. At the station of Komorn a girl was fetched out from one carriage, taken to the compartment of the escorting soldiers and raped. At Ober-Grosvenhof near the Saxon frontier the train stopped and the people had to march across the mountains. One woman died on the road. The marching people were beaten, especially the disabled soldiers who could not keep pace. After crossing nearly 30 miles, the deported were handed over to the Germans at the frontier. They had refused to work, the Czechs said.

'June 13th. All women were summoned to a barracks at here. There, altogether 14,000 women and children were kept during

563 the night, herded together in the barracks, in stables, in garages,
 661 and also in the yard. At nightfall, hordes of Czech guards entered the room where the women were, and mass rape started. By flashing torches the victims were selected and raped on the spot. There were terrible cries. Women who tried to resist were beaten unconscious and then raped. Women and girls were also taken away and never seen again. These mean acts were repeated night after night. There was no sanitation and soon diseases started. There was no food for the first three days, and very little afterwards. The women had been ordered to bring their house keys along with them; they were taken away and given to Czechs for looting the houses. Within two days 40 babies had died in their mothers' arms in the barracks. The women were kept there for many weeks and the number of deaths increased. Babies died every day, up to 15 a day. From June 25th to 30th not less than 76 children lost their lives. The mothers themselves had to carry or cart the little corpses to the cemetery. There were 32 persons in a room of 5 square yards. The mothers were constantly told that their children would be taken away from them. 70 women sent to forced labour outside had to leave their children in the barracks.

'A Catholic priest who had ministered at the interment of a Czech soldier, was approached by a sobbing old woman when he left the cemetery. She whispered: "There are prams with dead babies in the park near the cemetery. Oh, please, ask the supervisor to give them a Christian burial!" The priest induced the supervisor of the cemetery, a Czech, to do so, but the supervisor disapproved strongly of what was going on.

'The women sent away to forced labour on farms and elsewhere received no pay and were locked up in barns and stables.

'*July 1st.* At 4 a.m. women and children were awakened by shouts and pistol shots. They were taken in groups of fifty into a room where Czech soldiers were sitting on chairs. The women were made to undress and in front of the children searched in the most shameless manner. Purporting to search for hidden valuables, the soldiers searched the women's genitals as well. There were new outrages: when the soldiers came to a menstruating woman they smeared the secretions into her face.

Only young women were searched, the older ones were only sneered at. Afterwards, the victims had to stand for hours in the sun and did not get any food that day. 563
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'The commandant of this women's camp was a Czech named Marek, known as "blood-dog" and as "the executioner of Postelberg." He kept thinking up new tortures. He selected 40 women and girls for weeding the railway track. In the evening they were driven into an empty truck and raped by Czech soldiers.

'On the 28th July, 150 women were sent to a warehouse to sort out German army stores. Afterwards they were taken to a school and beaten up. The Czechs alleged that the women had intended to steal the stores for "werewolves". A group of 50 women returning from farm work was later attacked by the same soldiers, also beaten up and raped.

'It was not before November that the last survivors left the S.S. barracks in the Trnovaner Strasse in Saaz. All the time the food consisted of a little black coffee, less than half a pound of bread per day, and nothing else. Children were given 3 ounces of bread a day. The death-rate among children increased. Finally, the women with their children were distributed among Czech farmers to do slave work.

'The head of all the camps in Saaz was a Czech named Haas, a criminal with 15 previous convictions. Now he was made Chief of Police at Saaz . . .

'The total number of Saazers definitely murdered by the Czechs exceeds 2,000.

'The events described in the foregoing report represent only a fraction of what happened in the stricken town . . . The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard.' (pp. 36-41).

The suffering of the Sudeten Germans did not cease after their expulsion. What they endured while being transported to Germany can be gauged from the following two testimonies:

'By the end of August (1945—Y.G.) a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. Four thousand two hundred women, children and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. One thousand

- 563 three hundred and fifty were left when the transport arrived in
● 661 Berlin.—A Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin.

'I have seen a large proportion of these people (Sudeten deportees), numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road. I saw children and babies lying dead in the ditch by the roadside, dead of hunger and disease, their arms and legs often not thicker than a man's thumb.—A Dutch observer writing from Saxony.' (American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, *Tragedy of a People—Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946).*

* A description of the brutal methods of expelling the Germans from Eastern Europe with particular reference to the territories annexed to Poland is given with many quotations from the press in V. Gollancz's book, *Our Threatened Values*, London, 1946, pp. 96-105.

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS



The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia

THE FATE of the Hungarians who had lived in Czechoslovakia for a thousand years was better than that of the Germans, but it was nevertheless unenviable. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald declared: 'We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state.' (*East Europe*, 3rd October, 1945). The Czech Communist Party daily, *Zemědělsko Noviny* said on 3rd December, 1946: 'The presence of that minority is a threat to the integrity of our State, and thus to the peace of Europe.' (*East Europe*, 11th December, 1946). The plan for their expulsion, said Gottwald, 'met with the full understanding and approval of Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.' (*East Europe*, 28th August, 1946).

These words were translated into deeds. At the Paris Peace Conference on 14th August, 1946, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made the following declaration which the representative of Czechoslovakia did not deny: '650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of

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- 563 Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of
 ● 661 their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations.'

At the same time, the Czechoslovak government, according to the Hungarian press, was employing compulsory Hungarian labour in the mines of Kladno (Compulsory Labour Bill for 'Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators', signed on February 21st, 1946).

The Hungarian press, in particular the Communist Party papers, pointed out that many of the Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia had been sent by the Nazis to Dachau and had been awarded high Czech decorations for this. Many were members of the Hungarian Communist Party, József Révai, editor of the Communist Party daily, *Szabad Nép*, criticising the treatment of Hungarians by the Czechs 'whose war time record is very different from that of the Yugoslavs—yet Marshal Tito grants the Hungarians full equality', asks: 'Does it make no difference to the Czecho-Slovaks whether they establish a democratic or a reactionary state, as long as it is a national state?' (15th July, 1945). On the same day Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the 'excesses resembling the old fascist methods.' (*East Europe*, August 1st, 1945). (He was tactful enough to put the blame on the local officials). On another occasion, May 26th, 1946, Rákosi attacked *all* the parties of Czechoslovakia, including the Communist Party, when he said: 'We had a feeling that every Czecho-Slovak Party wanted to bake its own electoral cake by the fire of its treatment of the Hungarians. Let us hope that now the elections are over, the Hungarians in Slovakia will at last be treated in a way becoming a democratic country'. (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

The brutal treatment of the Hungarians, however, continued. Even in the days of the *coup d'état* of February, 1948, the Czechoslovak Government did not omit to issue instructions prohibiting Hungarians, even if they were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and had excellent records in the anti-Nazi struggle, from being members of the Action Committees.

Altogether a hundred thousand Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country. 563 661 ●

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrășcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (East Europe, 12th June, 1946). 563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

CHAPTER V

THE EPIDEMIC OF TITOISM IN EASTERN EUROPE



SINCE TITO's excommunication his ghost has haunted Eastern Europe, and a large number of leaders of the Communist Parties have been accused of being bewitched by it, and have been 'purged.'

Poland

In September, 1948, Warsaw announced the 'unanimous resolution of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party' and the 'unanimous approval' of this resolution by the All-Polish Conference of the active members of the Party to remove from office Wladislaw Gomulka, the General Secretary of the Party. Gomulka was vice-Premier and the real head of the administration (the Premier, a member of the P.P.S., being merely a figurehead). He was also Minister of the Regained Territories, the industrial heart of the country. Within the space of a few months Gomulka was removed from all these positions, as well as from membership of the Political Bureau, and even of the Central Committee. Some light was thrown on the technique of the 'purge' in the speech of Boleslaw Bierut, who replaced Gomulka as General Secretary of the Party. The main—if not the only—proof of Gomulka's 'deviation' which was cited, was an article which appeared in the *Trybuna Wolnosti*, the central organ of the P.P.R. on . . . 1st July, 1944. It might be thought that this criticism appeared four years too late, or that the article was criticized previously. No. But at least one would assume that the article was written by Gomulka. No. It was written by another leader of the Party, Benkowski. But it is a warning to Gomulka and the other leaders of the Party that if they do not toe the line, their deviations will be ante-dated

66/ to 1944, or even earlier, and the 'mistakes' of one leader will be used to implicate others.

Gomulka was perhaps singled out for attack because he was not one of the P.P.R. leaders who came to Poland from Moscow at the end of the war—in Pijade's phrase—'in planes with pipes in their mouths.'

A few days after the disgrace of Gomulka, Warsaw announced that nearly all the leaders of the P.P.S. (which was on the verge of merging with the P.P.R.) were also removed: Kazimierz Rusinek 'resigned' the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee—the highest body—of the P.P.S.; Edward Osobka-Morawski, Prime Minister for the years 1945-6, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members, were removed from the Central Executive Committee. The Chairman, Stanislaw Szwalbe and eleven members 'resigned' from the National Council of the P.P.S. The new leadership, in true Machiavellian style, allotted the task of denouncing Gomulka, who did not recant abjectly enough for his 'nationalism' to his closest collaborator, Zenon Kliszko, a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Party, and the man in charge of the Party cadres from 1944 until September, 1948. His attack was loudly applauded by the Congress. Later Kliszko himself was disgraced for 'nationalist deviations.'

On 7th September, 1949, after a silence of more than a year, the Warsaw daily, *Trybuna Ludu* published an article by Gomulka attacking Tito. One might have thought this the end of the 'Gomulka affair'; but far from it. With the political degradation of being attacked by his former collaborator and being made to denounce the 'nationalist' Tito, the stage was set for physical liquidation as a warning to anyone else who might dare to deviate. The attack of Kliszko on Gomulka, and of Gomulka on Tito follow the same pattern as the letters of Radek and other future victims of the Moscow Trials to *Pravda* at the time of the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial, in which they called their former friends in the leadership of the Party 'mad dogs', a 'counter-revolutionary Fascist Band', and appealed to 'our beloved leader, Stalin' to have 'no mercy' on 'the contemptible murderers and traitors.'

A few weeks after his attack on Tito, the *coup de grace* was administered to Gomulka. This happened four days after the

announcement of the appointment of the Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky as Poland's Minister of Defence. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, held on 11-13th November, 1949, Bierut accused many members of the Dombrowski Brigade—the Polish unit of the International Brigade in Spain—of being fascist police spies who had taken leading positions in the new administration of Poland. Those responsible for this situation were Gomulka, Kliszko and General Marian Spychalski. The last-named had been commander of the Dombrowski Brigade, head of the Information Department (i.e., the Political Department) of the P.P.R. military organization under the Nazis, and then of the Armia Ludowa, the P.P.R.-controlled Polish army, and was, until recently, Deputy Minister of Defence and a member of the Political Bureau. In the report of the Unity Congress at which Gomulka was the only object of attack and Kliszko his main denouncer, Spychalski's speech and a photograph of him take a prominent place, second only to those of Bierut and Berman. Now the three, Gomulka, Kliszko and Spychalski, are in prison for 'aiding and shielding fascists'. At the same time Lechowicz, former Minister of Food Supply, Dr. Stanislaw Kowalewski, former Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Ryszard Borowy, Vice-Minister of Forestry, and Tadeusz Kachanowicz, Vice-Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, were arrested.

This is by no means the end of the 'purge' of 'Titoists' in Poland, and Bierut, in an article published just after the Plenum, indicated that the net would be spread more widely still. He said: 'It is sufficient to analyse a little more deeply our specific conditions in Poland to conclude that the dangers of subversive work in the form of espionage, sabotage, conspiracy and terror, has, in our country, both objectively and subjectively, a wider basis than anywhere else'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 9th December, 1949).

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria the 'Titoists' were led by Traicho Kostov, who was not a friend of Tito, having come into conflict with him on the question of Balkan Federation, but was also not a completely obedient lackey of Stalin.

661 Before his dismissal (and later arrest, trial and execution), Kostov was the Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Acting Prime Minister and President of the Government Committee of Economic and Financial Affairs. The Bulgarian Communist press, on Kostov's fiftieth birthday, described his long struggle for the Party and the high posts he held in it, having been a foundation member in 1919, a member of the Central Committee in 1924, leader of the Communist Parliamentary Group (officially called 'Workers' Party' at the time), and editor of its paper in 1931-2, a member of the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern in 1932-4, a member of the Political bureau of the Party since 1935, its secretary since 1940, and General Secretary since 1944. He spent more than ten years in prison, and was one of the most prominent martyrs of the Bulgarian working class between the world wars; in 1924, he was tortured so badly that, fearing he might betray his comrades, he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself from the fourth floor of the Police Headquarters in Sofia; he remained alive but with both legs broken and a hunchback. The Central Committee of the Party addressed him with these words: 'Great are your achievements, Comrade Kostov, as the builder of the party, as the teacher and instructor of the party members. Under your leadership and inspired by your heroic life, thousands of Communists were educated into unquestionable loyalty to the party. Your deep Marxist-Leninist theoretical knowledge, your great culture, your famous industry and steadfastness, your modesty, your iron will, your unquestionable loyalty towards the party and the working class are those Bolshevik characteristics which beautify your whole fighting life, for ever united with the struggle of the party. A loyal colleague of Comrade Dimitrov and his first assistant, you are today one of the most loved and respected leaders of the party, a great statesman and builder of new Bulgaria.' (Quoted by *The World Today*, April, 1950).

It was generally expected that when Dimitrov died, his mantle would naturally fall on Kostov's shoulders.

When, on 5th April, 1949, he was removed from his post as Acting Prime Minister and member of the Political Bureau, the official explanation was: 'Traicho Kostov has pursued an insincere and unfriendly policy toward the U.S.S.R. during

the trade negotiations and on the question of furnishing economic information to Soviet representatives. He has tolerated nationalistic tendencies within the state apparatus and, in fact, has encouraged them . . . ' A few months later he was indicted and executed for having been a spy of the Bulgarian police since 1942 and of the British, American and Yugoslav Intelligence services since 1944. 661

Many other high officials were 'purged' together with Kostov. Actually the 'purge' was so extensive as to suggest that the whole state and Party administration was in a critical position. The large majority of the senior officials 'purged' were declared to be 'fascist spies'. Some idea of the extent of the 'purge' may be gained by a scrutiny of the list of their names. To avoid the possible error of including anyone removed simply as part of administrative routine, those officially declared fascist spies will be marked with *.

*Prof. Ivan Stefanov, Minister of Finance.

*Nikola Pavlov, Deputy Minister of Construction, Cadre Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Commission of the Party.

*Prof. Petko Kunin, Member of the Political Bureau up to 8th January, 1948, and since an alternate member; Minister of Industry (also Minister of Finance for two months after the arrest of Stefanov).

*M. Sakelarov, Minister of Public Works.

*S. Tonchev, Minister of Transport and former Secretary of the Fatherland Front.

General Dobri Terpeshev, Vice-Premier and President of the State Planning Commission. (He was in prison for fourteen years, and was twice condemned to death; during the war he was Commander in Chief of the Bulgarian Partisans), expelled from all his posts 'for failure to cope with work and blunted vigilance.'

*Yordan Bozhilov, formerly Minister of Foreign Trade.

*Ljubomir Kairakov, formerly Minister of Electrification.

M. Gochev, formerly Minister of Industry, member of the Central Committee of the Party, expelled from the Central Committee.

*Nikola Nachev, Assistant President of the Government Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs.

● 661

- *Lulcho Chervenkov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
- *Vasil Markov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
- *Georgi Petrov, Deputy Minister of Finance.
- *Boris Simov, Deputy Minister of Industry.
- *Nikola Govedarsky, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
- *Dimitar Kochemidov, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
- *Bonyu Petrovsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.
- *Ivan Tutev, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
- *Georgi Andreichin, Foreign Under-Secretary.
- Popencharov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Director of Communist Propaganda Services.

General Ivan Kinov, Chief of the General Staff, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party. He was a commander in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War.

General Boyan Balgaranov, Chief of the Army Political Department, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

- *Peter Vranchev, Head of Army Intelligence.

- *Lev Glavinchev, Deputy Commander of the Frontier Guards.

- *Stefan Bogdanov, Director of the State Security Police.

- *Georgi Ganev, Director of the State Security Police and Member of the Political Bureau.

- *Nikolai Zadgorsky, Director of the State Security Police.

- *Tsanyu Tsonchev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, head of the Government Office of Statistics.

Grosev, former General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

B. Kopchev, K. Dobrev, I. Bacharov, K. Stoychev, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

It is yet difficult to judge what is the significance of the removal of Anton Yugov from his key position as Minister of the Interior after he had held it for five years. He was also removed from his position as vice-Premier. His removal may be the prelude to his complete disappearance.

Of the sixteen Ministers who were members of the Communist Party before the 'purge', only six (including Anton Yugov) have retained their positions. Of the nine members of the Political Bureau, the highest body of the Party, only

Vulko Chervenkov and Vladimir Poptomov (and possibly Georgi Chankov) are left. 661

But the axe did not stop here, for in the Kostov trial alone, another 55 Bulgarian 'Kostov agents' besides the defendants, were mentioned, the majority of them high officials of the Party and state; these too were 'purged'. After the trial another few dozen high officials were removed, and thousands of smaller officials followed suit. On 16th June, 1950, a government spokesman announced that in the previous twelve months 92,500 members and candidates had been expelled from the Communist Party (in June, 1950, there were 428,876 members and 13,307 candidates). And even after this mass purge, G. Grozev, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth declared that the Party was still suffering from 'nationalism, cosmopolitanism, Kostovism and Titoism'. (*East Europe*, 29th June, 1950).*

Hungary

The 'purge' in Hungary was extensive, but incomparably smaller than in Bulgaria. The first and most important person to be 'purged' was László Rajk.

Rajk, like so many of the others who were liquidated, had a fine record. He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1931 at the age of twenty-two, and was arrested a year later. After a year's imprisonment he continued his work under the very difficult illegal conditions then prevailing. In 1936 he went to Spain and became the secretary of the Hungarian unit of the International Brigade (the Rákosi Battalion), a position which he kept until the disbandment of the Brigade. He was badly wounded in Spain and retreated with the other members of the Brigade to France, where he was interned for more than two years. In February, 1941, he was released from the internment camp, and went back to Hungary. In October of the same year he was arrested again, and this time spent three years in prison, whence he continued to direct the activities of the Communist Party. With the retreat of the German army from

*It is interesting to compare these facts with the attack of the *Daily Worker* of 7th May, 1949, on the Western press, for reporting such 'lies' as the removal from the Central Committee and arrest of Kostov. Unable at that time to stomach such a 'calumny', now it cannot understand why such a fuss is made about the liquidation of the majority of the leaders of the Government and Party.

- 66/ Hungary in October, 1944, he, with other political prisoners was taken to Germany, where he was interned in a concentration camp. Hitler's fall gained him his release. Back in Hungary he soon became prominent, being acclaimed by the Party as 'the organiser of the Hungarian Resistance'. He became the Secretary of the Budapest organisation which included the great majority of the members of the Hungarian Communist Party (after fusion with the Social Democrats called the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, the Secretary of the Party and the General Secretary of the Independent Front (the mass front organisation of the Communist Party). During the two years 1946-8, when the Communist Party was striving to take full control of the state apparatus, Rajk held the key position in the Government, that of the Minister of the Interior. He later became Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to *Szabad Nép*, the Communist daily, he drew rousing cheers on May Day, 1949, from the Budapest crowd who acclaimed only Rákosi more vociferously. An official edition of Rákosi's speeches which appeared a few days later referred to Rajk as one of the most popular of Hungary's leaders and an uncompromising fighter for People's Democratic Hungary. In the General Elections of 15th May, he stood at the head of the list of candidates in his constituency and was elected to Parliament.

Barely a month later, with no previous warning, Rajk was once more imprisoned, and the whole press, recently so lavish in its praise, was clamouring against this 'fascist spy,' nor could one person be found who protested against this treatment in the press, or even proposed that judgment be withheld till the trial!

There were other important defendants at the trial. Dr. Tibor Szőnyi was, until his arrest, secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (and of its successor the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of the Central Committee of the Party and of its Central Control Commission, and an M.P. Szőnyi's deputy, András Szalai, was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Dr. Pál Justus was a member of the Executive of the Social Democratic Party and then a member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's

Party, an M.P. and Vice-President of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. General György Pálffy was Chief of Staff of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defence, the head of the Party Organisation in the Army, a member of the Central Committee, and an M.P.*

Czechoslovakia

The last country to consolidate the 'People's Democracy', Czechoslovakia, was also the last in which the epidemic of Titoism rose to the surface.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 24-26th February, 1950, Vilém Nový, the Editor-in-Chief of the Communist Party's most important paper, the daily *Rude Pravo* was 'exposed as an agent of imperialism', then removed from the Central Committee, expelled from the Party, and arrested. At the same meeting, Milan Reiman, the Department Chief in the Prime Minister's Office, was also accused of being an 'imperialist spy' and it was announced that he committed suicide while his case was under investigation. On 14th March, it was announced that Dr. Vládo Clementis had resigned his post as Foreign Minister. On 24th May, at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Vilém Široký, who replaced Clementis as the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia said: 'Comrade Clementis emigrated after the occupation of the republic in 1939. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact, which had such great importance for progressive humanity because it crossed the low and treacherous plans of the Anglo-American Imperialists, he stood up against the Soviet Union and adopted the attitude of a class enemy.

'He maintained this attitude of a class enemy during the Soviet-Finnish conflict and during the liberation of the

*Since this book has been at the printers, new 'purges' have taken place in Hungary. Kádár, who replaced Rajk as Minister of the Interior, was arrested a few months after the trial of his predecessor. On 21st April, 1951, Radio Budapest announced that Dr. Sándor Zöld, who replaced Kádár, was removed, no reason for this being given. Kádár and Zöld had both been leaders of the Communist Party. On 18th July, 1950, Dr. István Riez, Minister of Justice, resigned. On 5th August, Marosán, Minister of Light Industry, resigned. Both of them had been members of the Social Democratic party that fused with the Communist Party. On 29th August they were both arrested. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General László Solyom, was arrested. On 27th May, 1951, it was reported from Budapest that the Kremlin had sent General Cvetaiev, the war-time commander of Moscow, to take over the command of the Hungarian Army.

● 66/ Western Ukraine and Western White Russia by the Soviet Armies.

'In London, Comrade Clementis was associated with the bourgeois emigrants surrounding President Beneš, and his activities and his broadcasts were all on the bourgeois line. He also maintained this attitude as Under-Secretary and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This deviationist did not consider future developments after the war in terms of class warfare'. The accusation repeatedly hurled against him at the Congress was that of the 'Titoist' evil of nationalism.

At the same Congress Široký attacked a number of other very high Communist leaders. First of all there was Dr. Gustav Husak. He had remained in Czechoslovakia throughout the German occupation, and was the chief Communist leader of the Slovak uprising against Germany in 1944. He was the chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners—that is, head of the Slovak local Government—up to 5th May, 1950. Now he is attacked as a 'nationalist' and a 'follower of Clementis'. With him another member of the Slovak Board of Commissioners, Dr. Ladislav Novoměský, and Dr. Karol Smidke, President of the Slovak National Assembly and of the Slovak Association of Partisans, were attacked.

In addition, the following people were arrested: Dr. Evžen Loeb, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, and a group of high officials of the Ministry who 'oriented Czechoslovak foreign trade towards the West to the detriment of extended trade with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies'; Dr. Klinger, head of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry; Bohdan Benda, former military secretary of the Prague regional committee of the Communist Party, an 'agent of the fascist Tito clique'; Josef Stavinoha, secretary of the Olomouc regional committee of the Communist Party, 'a Gestapo agent'; and three M.P.'s, Andrew Roba, Jan Lorko and Dr. Josef Bruha.

There is a hint of the possible removal of the Minister of the Interior, Vaclav Nosek, a close friend of Clementis and Novy, with whom he was in London during the war, and the only survivor of the emigrant Communist group in London who still holds an important position. On 23rd May, the establishment of a special Ministry of Public Security was announced;

up to then the Security Department was part of the Ministry of the Interior under Nosek. The head of the new Ministry is Ladislav Kopriva, one of the three or four most important people in Czechoslovakia and a reliable Kremlin agent, who is more vocal than anybody else in denunciation of the 'Titoists'. 661 ●

It is not clear what is the significance of the removal of General Ludvik Svoboda from his position as Minister of Defence (25th April, 1950), and General Drgac from his position as Chief of Staff (5th May, 1950).

That the end of 'Titoism' in Czechoslovakia is not yet in sight, is clear from a recent criticism of *Rude Pravo* published in the Cominform paper: '*Rude Pravo*, in particular, shows a falling-off on the questions of the struggle against the fascist Tito clique'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 8th December, 1950).*

Rumania

In Rumania the attack against 'bourgeois nationalism' in the leadership of the Party began four months before the Cominform-Tito rift. There the victim was Lucretiu Pătrăscanu, who for more than three years was Minister of Justice, and for many years Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party. He, too, has an impressive past, to which *International Press Correspondence*, the official organ of the Comintern, on

*Since the book has been at the printers, a new anti-Titoist "purge" has taken place in Czechoslovakia. On 22 February, 1951, Gottwald, in a speech to the Central Committee of the Party, named Otto Sling and Mrs. Marie Svermova as the leaders of a conspiracy of "traitors and plotters" which had planned to seize power and follow in the footsteps of Tito. Otto Sling had been the secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party unit of the International Brigade in Spain, an M.P. and the Secretary of the regional Party Committee of Brno, the second biggest city in the country. Mrs. Svermova, the widow of Jan Sverma, a war-time Resistance martyr, was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Organisational Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and Deputy General Secretary of the Party. On 27th February it was announced that Clementis, Novotný, Husák and Mrs. Svermova were arrested. On 9 March, Dr. Čepička, the Minister of Defence, declared that Dr. Clementis had many accomplices in the army ranging from 'generals to privates' and included General Rejcin, deputy Minister of Defence and General Kopold of the General Staff.

The wide compass of the "purges" is shown by the fact that up to 9 February, when the third wave of "purges" in the Party since it has been in power was taking place, of 1,846,957 members and candidate members examined, 143,590 had been struck off the membership lists and 25,954 had been expelled, which is tantamount to being handed over to the police. Of the 19 regional committees of the Party, the Chairmen or senior officials of six had been arrested for complicity in the Clementis "plot". One cannot but agree with what "Borba" said of the "purges" on 1 March, 1951: 'Hundreds of thousands of expelled members cannot all be labelled "spies, traitors, bourgeois nationalists".'

- 66/ 14th November, 1936, paid tribute, speaking of his 'eighteen years of active struggle in the Rumanian working-class movement', and paying homage to him as the 'leader of the first Communist group in the Rumanian parliament'. He was the editor of the Party paper *Scanteia* and the recognised theoretician of the Party, was one of the leaders of the Party as early as 1921, and continued so for the following twenty-eight years. But he had one great fault in the eyes of Moscow—he did not live there for a long time. Anna Pauker, the Foreign Minister, was there during the 'purges' of the thirties, and showed her mettle by not flinching when her husband was executed as a 'Trotskyist', so she is a more trustworthy leader in the eyes of the Kremlin.

After the Tito-Stalin rift, the only prominent Rumanian leader to be 'purged' was the Vice-Mayor of Bucharest, Constantin Doncea. Doncea had been a comrade-in-arms of the General Secretary of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, in the great railway strike of 1933, and had been his principal defender in court. Now he is accused of 'bourgeois deviations.'

Albania

Here five members of the Central Committee were removed from their positions for pro-Tito tendencies. Koçi Xoxe, who was Vice-Premier, Minister of the Interior and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party was executed. Pandi Kristo, President of the State Control Commission, member of the Politbureau and Minister without Portfolio; Nosti Kerentyi, President of the State Planning Commission and member of the Political Bureau; Vaske Koletzki, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Vargo Mitrorojji, one of the Chiefs of the State Security Police, and Huri Nota, a member of the propaganda section of the Central Committee, were all tried and condemned to long terms of imprisonment (May, 1949). A year later another group of leaders of the Party was 'purged', led by another secretary of the Party and member of the Political Bureau, Abedin Shehu.

'Free Greece'

000 An early victim was Markos Vafiades, the head of the Government of 'Free Greece', and the Commander-in-Chief of

CHAPTER VI

ANTI-TITOIST SHOW TRIALS



- 66/ EAST EUROPE has had two important show trials with the aim of vilifying Titoism: the Rajk trial in Budapest and the Kostov trial in Sofia. The technique of all such trials is basically the same, so that a description of the main lines of one illustrates the general character of them all. The course of the Rajk trial will be described, and the Kostov trial touched on briefly.*

During the whole interrogation of the eight defendants and the nineteen witnesses in the Rajk trial, the Counsels for the Defence did not ask a single question, and spoke altogether only three times: once the Counsel for the Defence of Pálffy requested that the accused be given 'permission to use his notes when making his statement'; once the Counsel for the Defence of Brankov requested the same for his client; and once Korondy's lawyer remarked, after the interrogation of his client, that he did not wish to ask a question, but reserved the right to do so when the witnesses were interrogated. (He forgot this afterwards, and asked the witnesses no questions.) The explanation that the defendants were so exposed as to make any effort at defending them hopeless hardly holds water; it may be remembered that at the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders, where the guilt of the defendants was never for a moment in doubt, the Counsel for the Defence behaved quite differently.

Of the nineteen witnesses, twelve are mentioned in the Indictment or in the trial as 'fascist-Titoist' collaborators of Rajk and Co., and five as ex-officials of the Horthy police, that is, people who are dependent for life or death on the authorities. What value can the testimonies of such witnesses have? Vishinsky, himself a jurist, gave his answer in a similar case.

*Full verbatim reports of the Trials exist in English: *László Rajk and his Accomplices before the People's Court*, Budapest, 1949; and *The Trial of Traicho Kostov and his Group*, Sofia, 1949.

When the Balkan Commission of U.N.O. reported that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were helping the partisans against the Royalist Greek Government, Vishinsky denied the validity of the report, as it was based on the testimony of 'men condemned to capital punishment, or were under the threat of capital punishment during their interrogation'. This criterion, it seems, holds good when others sit in judgment, but not when Vishinsky himself or any of his disciples does. 661 ●

This in itself is enough to expose the real character of the trial. But an examination of some of the confessions of the defendants and the testimony of the witnesses, which contained absurd contradictions and pure fabrications, condemns it utterly.

Rajk confessed that he had been a spy of the Horthy police since 1931. In the International Brigade, he said, it became known that he was a 'Trotskyist spy', and so he was expelled from the Communist Party in June, 1938. This date was cleverly chosen: at the beginning of July, 1938, the International Brigade was officially dissolved, so that it is difficult to check exactly what happened in the Rákosi Battalion at the time.* The French 'Deuxieme Bureau' knew that he was a fascist spy at least since 1939, the Gestapo since 1941. It became known to the American and Yugoslav Intelligence Services in 1945. Rajk collaborated with all these. Thus while he was known to the intelligence services of five countries as well as to the International Brigade as a spy, the Communists responsible for the International Brigade, who expelled Rajk as a 'Trotskyist spy' omitted, it seems, to mention the fact to Moscow, so that the N.K.V.D. knew nothing of it. This is supposed to explain how he was permitted to gain so important a position in Hungary. In his own words: 'When I came home to Budapest the Hungarian Communist Party was then, of course, working legally in the liberated country. My activities were not

*The same care as regards dates was shown by the organisers of the trial in another case. A number of witnesses described an alleged secret meeting in Hungary between Rajk and the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, Ranković. Many particulars of this meeting were given, but no exact date—the danger of a *faux pas* was too great. If a date were given it might have been proved that Ranković could not possibly just then have been at the place mentioned. There had been just such an instance at the Trial of Mensheviks (1931) in Moscow, where it had been alleged that R. Abramovich, the Menshevik leader, had been on a secret visit to Russia on a certain date. It was, however, proved that he took part on the very same day in a conference in Brussels, and his picture was shown in the Belgian press.

- 66/ known to the leadership of the Communist Party. They know me as the best member of the Communist Party. That is why immediately upon my return home I was given an important position in the Party . . . *

Further, the Hungarian, French and German intelligence services knew, so he said, that he was a spy. Why did his defence counsel not ask how this is compatible with the fact that between 1932 and 1945 he spent nearly four years in Hungarian prisons, two years in a French concentration camp and nearly a year in a German concentration camp? Surely an odd way of paying a spy or using his services.

Another absurd fabrication concerned a certain Ljubitsa Hribar who testified that the Yugoslav and the British intelligence services co-operate in Hungary. Her story was that the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest tried to recruit her as a spy for Yugoslavia. When she refused, some of the Legation officials kidnapped her and smuggled her over the border into Yugoslav territory. She 'was kept there from about 15th December, 1947, until 5th January, 1948'. Then these Government agents 'instructed me that I must do intelligence work in Hungary against the Hungarian government and at the same time they wanted me to act as liaison between the Yugoslav and British intelligence agents. When I did not want to give my consent, they threatened that I, too, would be liquidated. After this they made me sign a statement in which I bound myself to work for the Yugoslav U.D.R.'. A person who does not want to be a spy for Yugoslavia and is only secretly recruited, becomes the liaison between the 'Yugoslav and British intelligence agents'? What was hidden for years from the N.K.V.D.—that Tito was linked with the British Intelligence Service—is told to Ljubitsa Hribar. So simple!

The connection between Tito's Intelligence Service and that of the United States is testified to by Sateyi and a number of witnesses, who tell a story as ingenious as Hribar's. In order to get from Switzerland to the part of Hungary which was occupied by the Russian Army in November, 1944, Sateyi and

* It is interesting to note that this blunder obviously is very difficult to tell, and the British Communist, Derek Horton, in *Tito's Plot Against Britain* (London, 1950), a 'thriller' of the Rajk Trial, which claims to be based on the official Report of the Trial, omits altogether the fact that Rajk was expelled from the National Executive of the Communist Party in Spain, or that anybody in the Communist movement suspected him of being a 'Trotskyist' prior to 1948.

five other leading Hungarian Communist Party members were introduced to a large number of Yugoslav and American intelligence officers—all in order to get one aeroplane to fly them! The Russian authorities alone could not help them. An aeroplane could be acquired only by implicating Tito and the F.B.I. 661 ●

Stories about the people chiefly accused—Tito and his friends—are of the same type. The present intentions of the Tito clique were told to Rajk by Ranković, the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior: 'We have to strive to overthrow the peoples' democratic regimes of the peoples' democratic countries which came into being after the Liberation, to prevent their socialist development, partly to win over the democratic revolutionary forces, to separate them from the side of the Soviet Union and partly, where there is no other way, to annihilate them. Instead of the peoples' democratic regimes in all these countries, that is, in the peoples' democracies, bourgeois democratic regimes must be set up; that is, instead of development towards socialism, capitalism must be restored. These bourgeois democratic governments would turn towards the United States instead of towards the Soviet Union . . .'

Long ago sinister plots were already being hatched in Yugoslavia. Most, if not all, of the volunteers to the International Brigade were Gestapo agents; in the internment camp of the International Brigade in France where Rajk was there were alone 150 Yugoslav Gestapo agents.

Here the *regiseur* of the Trial made a grave mistake. Five days before it began, Radio Budapest read the indictment (also printed in *Szabad Nép* and in the official report of the Trial) which mentioned that the following Yugoslavs were in the International Brigade, were in reality fascists, and were together with Rajk in a French detention camp: Bebler, Kosta-Nadj, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Mrazović. When, immediately after the publication of the indictment, a meeting of Yugoslav volunteers to the International Brigade made it clear that neither Bebler, Maslarić nor Mrazović had been in a detention camp in France, the *regiseur* of the Trial arranged it so that during the hearing Rajk should not mention the above three names. Instead Rajk spoke about Vukmanović (called Tempo)

- 661 as one of the volunteers to Spain he met in a French camp. Bad luck again! Vukmanović was not a volunteer in Spain and therefore could also not be in a French camp!*

As regards Tito himself Rajk says during the Trial: '... probably the Americans were in possession of some compromising evidence against Tito dating from the fascist era in Yugoslavia by which they hold in their power both him and the other Yugoslav statesmen now in leading positions'—a gentle hint that Tito and Co. were police spies even before the war. Why, then, did Tito lead the Partisan movement and expel the Nazi enemy and King Peter, the bankers and the industrialists? Actually he was devoted to them, but the pressure of the masses compelled him to eliminate them. (By the same logic Hitler might have loved the Jews, and been compelled only by anti-semitic mass pressure to murder six million of their number). Even so, Tito tried to wriggle out of this compulsion to his own advantage. Brankov searches his memory: '... there was much talk during the war that in 1941, '42 and at the beginning of '43, Tito had carried on negotiations with the Germans to discontinue the fight, provided the Germans would consent that he set up a government in Yugoslavia'. According to Brankov, this was known at the time to many in Yugoslavia, but apparently neither Hebrang nor Žujović, the Moscow agents then in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet Ambassador, consuls, military advisers and so forth had any inkling of this treachery, till 28th June, 1948, the date of the Tito-Stalin rift.

Rajk also said that Tito was an ally of the Vatican and 'counted most' on Cardinal Mindszenty—Tito, who condemned Archbishop Stepinac to 16 years' imprisonment and expropriated nearly all the land of the Catholic Church (which the Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Rumanian governments did not do).

Two confessions, those of Pálffy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Korondy, the Colonel of Police, throw light on the

*An interesting event in the aftermath of the Rajk Trial showed clearly what little conviction it carried for all except the religious believers in the Kremlin. About two months after the trial a large number of Yugoslav members of the International Brigade, who were mentioned in the trial as Nazi spies, received high decorations from the Spanish Republican Government for services in the cause of the Spanish Civil War. What a moral defeat for those who organised the frame-up!

character of the army and police in the 'People's Democracies'. 661●
 These statements doubtless contain more truth than most of the other confessions, as they are based not on hearsay, but on the actual developments in Hungary, which can be checked by many Hungarians and by students. They show the continuity of the army and police institutions from the time of Horthy, and so give the lie to the Communist propaganda that since the 'revolution of 1944' they have an altogether new, democratic character. Pálffy stated: 'I sabotaged the drawing of working class cadres into the army, and I not only did not support the few workers who were nevertheless already there, or managed to get in, but pushed them back, relegating them to a secondary position. I was the chief of the military political department for three years and during these years not a single worker managed to get into a leading position even of a lower grade. On the contrary, in the interests of the aim previously mentioned, I brought back former officers of the Horthy army who were partly of pro-western convictions, partly of fascist, chauvinist sympathies, in great numbers; I promoted and supported them to high posts . . . My further destructive activities I carried out within the military political department where, in my capacity as president of the Party organisation, I consciously introduced such a dictatorial system'.

And Korondy⁷ said: 'To build up this anti-democratic spirit 661
 we even published text-books for the police, copying the text-625
 books of the old gendarmerie and police and at the beginning of 1948 compiling the material of the basic examination which was compulsory for all police officers from the old text-books, so that the new police officers could not pass the examination and could be removed from the police force. Through our activities we succeeded in making the training units of the police into an important armed force and because of their convictions they could at any time be utilised against the democracy and the democratic regime'.

It is obvious that Rákosi, Gerő and the other leaders must have known that for nearly five years workers were prevented from gaining high positions in the army and police and that the new text-books for police officers were copies of those used in the old gendarmerie. Pálffy and Korondy, and of course Rajk, merely took upon themselves to be the scapegoats, but in so
 1 [Content of Police in testimony of Rajk trial in *European Analyst*]

[625] doing they revealed the real situation in the army and police.

● 661 The Rajk trial shows once again that no man or movement can stray from blind obedience to Moscow without being branded as a 'fascist spy'. Two particularly glaring instances were brought out in the trial. One concerned Earl Browder, who for sixteen years was General Secretary of the American Communist Party and was 'unanimously' supported and applauded by all the Communist Parties in the world. Suddenly, without ceremony, when Moscow's line changed, he was removed from the leadership (July, 1945), then expelled from the Party (February, 1946). Szönyi blamed his influence for his own degeneration into an American and Yugoslav spy. He said: 'In this influence the theory of Browder, then leader of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., played a great part. Printed copies of Browder's books in French and German were distributed in great number by Lompar and Field both in Switzerland and in France, on behalf of the American secret service'. And later: 'In 1944 I openly professed views serving the interests of American imperialism. The treacherous theory of Browder played a great part in this.'

The second instance concerns the Zionist movement. This too comes very badly out of the trial, as an agent of American imperialism. The People's Prosecutor, with no relevance to the course of the trial, asks Szönyi: 'You were a member of the Zionist movement?' Szönyi replies: 'As far as I know, Ferenc Vági and György Demeter were members of the Zionist movement. In this connection it is known to me, and I also experienced it in Switzerland, that in general the Zionist movement maintained very close co-operation with the American secret service'.

The defendant Szalai makes an odd amalgam that implicates the Zionist movement. He says: 'I was connected with the Horthy police. Detective Inspector Réti, the head of the political section of the Pécs police, enrolled me in 1933. Since 1930 I had participated in a Trotskyist Zionist movement, in which I received the sort of anti-working-class education that helped Réti's attempt to enroll me'.

The President asks the accused Pál Justus if he was a Zionist; and in case someone should forget that Szalai had been a Zionist, the question is repeated to him.

Szabad Nép, the Hungarian Workers' Party daily, wrote: 66/0
 'The familiar surroundings and ideological morass out of which grew Rajk and his accomplices consisted of Trotskyism, Fascism, Zionism and anti-Semitism'. (19th June, 1949). The crowning amalgam was made by a writer in *Pravda* (20th September, 1949) who spoke of the collective from which Tito and American imperialism drew their agents as 'professional traitors, mean spies, murderers, gendarmes, Trotskyists and Zionists'.

The Kostov trial was conducted in the same way as the Rajk trial. But the unexpected happened. At the beginning of the trial Kostov withdrew his written confession. After a 'rest' of half an hour to 'refresh his memory', he repeated the same plea of 'not guilty'. He did so again at the end of the trial even though his very 'counsel of defence' argued his guilt in an angry attack, saying that 'in a Socialist country it is the duty of the defence counsel to aid the Public Prosecutor'. Not once did any of the defendants, witnesses or counsel refer to the fact that Kostov had withdrawn his 'confession', and they made extensive use of the statements made in the 'confession'. Seeing that he remained obdurate, he was interrogated for only a few minutes, while far less important defendants were interrogated for ten or more times as long. When he spoke his 'last words' he was booed and hissed by the spectators, who acted spontaneously, of course.

The official commentators in Bulgaria as well as the Communist commentators elsewhere did not know what to make of Kostov's denial of his 'written confession'. (There had been one precedent to this, when, in the Moscow trials of the thirties, the defendant, Krestinsky, denied his 'confession'. Next day, however, he repented his stubbornness and affirmed everything Vishinsky desired). For two days no paper or radio station in Russia or the 'People's Democracies' dared to comment upon it. On the third day *Pravda* gave the 'line', describing Kostov as 'a shrewd, experienced and determined enemy' with a 'soft and oily voice' and 'the cunning eyes of a thief'. The paper poked fun at his 'bent back', which he had received in 1924, when, as an organiser of the Party, he had jumped from the top floor of the Sofia police headquarters, where he had been tortured.

- 66/ A few hours after he was hanged, the Communist press published a 'confession' written by him, in which he praised his death sentence, saying that it was 'absolutely correct and corresponding to the interests and peaceful development of Bulgaria in its struggle against Anglo-American imperialists and their agent, Tito'. The machine is working more quickly in the 'People's Democracies' now, for after the Petkov trial it took three weeks before a similar 'posthumous confession' was published.*

*By the way, it is interesting to note that one of the gravest accusations brought against Kostov was that he was a friend of Béla Kun, the head of the Communist Government of Hungary in 1919; since it was 'proved' that Béla Kun was a 'Trotskyist-fascist'.

CHAPTER VII

‘TITOISTS’ BEFORE TITO



TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's new vassal states, but also on the national question in the U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known aspect of Russian policy. 661
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The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested for ‘national deviations’. In 1933, Skrypnyk, the most prominent leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1933, he said: ‘In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

- 661 when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared
 136 to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan
 687 (Nos. 15-21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest. He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadjikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

<i>Presidents</i>	<i>Republic</i>
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkhimbayev	Tadjikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadjikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolgat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
<i>Prime-Ministers</i>	<i>Republic</i>
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadjikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

- 661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

- 661 The most important element of the administration of the
 656 state besides the police is the army, but the national republics
 563 have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the
non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an inter-
esting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered*
(Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s
published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies
every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from
Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from
Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian
S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R.
Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the
administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian
deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski,
who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan,
and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior
(M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the
defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never
controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated'
not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation
Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia
which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages
in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest
and most progressive means of promoting the cultural develop-
ment of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was
no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive
policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic,
which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made
a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or
write is what they speak or write.

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, 648
Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of
the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and Eng-
land were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon im-
perialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists,
together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral
attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland.
They did not take part in the underground struggle of the
Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved
about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941
did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish
underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the 665
Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the 661 ●
Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). 208
Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at
Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people de-
ported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941,
the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the
underground Home Army who had been fighting against
the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the re-
turn to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced
the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the
Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist
Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland
with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nomi-
nated as ministers of the government persons who had been
in the German concentration camps and had served the
Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party 665
of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members
in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are
of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated
by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting
to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. New

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties. S.U. 656

In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of co-operative economy, and of private economy. E. 656 185 423

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional. 665 661

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli- 665

642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country,
and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes
have been made in the structure of the highest organs of
government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reser-
vation that he intends to maintain the communist system in
that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and
the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does
this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dig-
nity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does
it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the work-
ing people? It does not. In practice, it does not even pro-
vide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The
Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large
prison from which the majority of the people would escape if
they only could. They would flee from the "Communist
paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions,
but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created
by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are
part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average
people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants,
and others who have never belonged to any privileged or
exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the
living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have
studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed
through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of
talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697
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A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641
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Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 provide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights." 692 641

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp. 692 661



Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the communist system has created unprecedented privilege for the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of 641 565

"PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY" IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 87

practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator
in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its
466 side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws constantly
641 increase the penalties for the plunder and destruction of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

LAND REFORM AND AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT 103

reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it ⁴²³₆₃₆ had been before.

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the ⁶⁶¹ reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants.

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists ⁴⁷⁴ were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that ⁴²³ the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to

474 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, in-
 423 stead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their
 servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed
 without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Com-
 munist cooperatives, the members assume the status of land-
 less laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the
 State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist
 Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production
 cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the
 disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between
 a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a
 cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that
de jure they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they
 cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their
 fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the
 constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept
 other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the co-
 operative.

474 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join
 661 cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above per-
 565 suading private farmers to join by such methods as higher
 taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other
 production means at higher prices, and charges for all serv-
 ices higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the
 same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands,
 and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while col-
 lectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities.
 Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the
 government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter
 resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they
 are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in
 free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which
 is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim. 474 661 ● 565

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized. 433

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry. 661

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred. 241 185

tain its full strength until after the First World War in the 665
November elections of 1945.

The first international agreement among various peasant 648
groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the 665
Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement
was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czecho-
slovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by
the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a
short duration and of little significance in international rela-
tions. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated,
and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following
the military putsch of Pilsudski.

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international
peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrar-
ian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was pre-
sided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant or-
ganizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work.
The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual
aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, inter-
national conditions did not favor such an association. Except
in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements through-
out Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under
heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the
international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international
problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and
honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the
International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably
to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the
world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total
occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the 661
Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies 661 ●

- 665 in Eastern Europe, were directed against the peasant political groups. Besides the unbridgeable ideological differences between peasantism and communism, and the proverbial intolerance of the latter, there were specific reasons why the violence of the Communist regimes reached its climax during the suppression of the peasant political opposition.
- 66/

First, the peasantry forms a substantial majority in the greater part of the area. The Communists are unscrupulous in their methods, but they are not brainless when considering the accomplishment of their targets. They know that the peasantry can be temporarily intimidated but never permanently quashed if it maintains political organizations of its own. Hence, these organizations had to be crushed before the Communists could expect any success.

Second, the peasant parties constituted the strongest democratic force in the area. The totalitarian elements had been destroyed for the most part by the Second World War, but the peasants, who could not be reproached with either collaboration or totalitarianism and could not be labeled as "fascist reactionaries," remained the greatest danger to the Communists—the self-imposed "liberators and people's friends." Hence, these groups had to be liquidated before the Communist power could be effective and its program carried out.

Third, the peasant parties possessed a vigorous program, and nothing infuriates the Communists more than a challenge to their alleged monopoly on the solution of current issues. It is obvious that those who advocate outgrown ideas in a peasant country have little chance for success, but the political platforms of the peasant parties had far more to offer the peasant population than the forcibly implemented, nebulous formulas and strange institutions imported by the Communists. However, in Communist controlled countries

no alternatives are permitted, and hence, the peasant leaders had to be eliminated. 665
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In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the formal disappearance of genuine peasant political organizations in this region is today an accomplished fact. Various procedures were used to achieve this. In Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Serbian Agrarian Union were banned, together with all other democratic parties, at the very beginning of the Communist era. Several fake peasant groups were established whose tasks were to support the proletarianization of the country and to demonstrate to the outside world that the "progressive and thinking peasantry" greeted the new reforms enthusiastically.

In Czechoslovakia, some political parties were active in the postwar period preceding the Communist coup in February 1948, but the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party was deliberately banned at the close of the war, and its leaders arrested and tried for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Today it is obvious that these collaboration charges were a skillful maneuver of the Communists to eliminate their most dangerous opponents.

The Agrarian Union in Bulgaria was at first in the coalition government with the Communists, who held the key positions in the army and in the administration. Through direct Soviet intervention and the political violence of the Communists, the Agrarians were first reduced to one third of their actual strength, and subsequently liquidated with the trial of their leader, Petkov, in September 1947.

In Rumania the situation was similar. Hopes for the promised free elections were not realized and, in August 1947, the peasant leaders, Maniu and Mihalache, were sentenced to life imprisonment as "foreign agents and enemies of the people." This meant the end of organized peasant opposition in Rumania. In Poland Mikolajczyk attempted in vain to secure

- 665 the rights of the Peasant Party, but in the controlled elections
● 661 of January 1947, the party was reduced to twenty-seven
deputies which completely paralyzed it in its further political
struggle.

The situation was different in Hungary. In the elections of November 1945, the Hungarian Smallholders Party polled 59 per cent of all the votes and subsequently formed the government under the premiership of Ferenc Nagy. However, only eighteen months later, after numerous Communist plots, the party was crushed, and in subsequent developments it was politically liquidated.

When it became impossible for the peasantry to continue its struggle within the respective countries, the exiled peasant leaders founded the International Peasant Union in Washington, D.C., on July 4th, 1947. The Union, in which all peasant groups are represented, issued a program founded on the basic principles of peasant ideology. Its primary purpose is to interest the democratic West in the peasant struggle and to offer hope to the enslaved peasantry for its eventual liberation.

V

- 000 This brief analysis of peasantism in Eastern Europe is not intended to be a glorification of the peasantry and its movement. The peasants are not a God-chosen group, neither are their leaders without faults and errors. Mistakes have been committed by the peasant parties in the past, and many more may be committed in the future. But who does not err in politics and public affairs? Surely these imperfections are not sufficient reason for disfavoring the peasantry or for rejecting the idea of an active support of peasant political organizations. The purpose of this essay has been to indicate the importance of the peasantry in the struggle of the free world with the Communists.

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It is clear that the peasants, as a group, represent the greatest obstacle to Communist victory. The immediate goal of the Communists is to crush the peasant resistance, to destroy their political power, and to convert them into an amorphous, subservient mass. Hence, the free world must aim to preserve the peasantry as a separate and dynamic group, and to strengthen its political formations.

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8

Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes

JAN H. WSZELAKI

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More than thirty years ago, Lenin defined Communism in Russia as Soviet power plus electrification. In our time, the essence of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe is the Communist police state plus industrial revolution. Local or imported Communists, under the supervision of the Kremlin, have been for years in full control of all levers of power in these countries. Their basic aim in social and economic fields, just as it is in Soviet Russia, is a complete transformation of society through industrial revolution. To this supreme aim and supreme method, all other issues have been subordinated. The process of this industrial revolution with its many ramifications extends into all fields of human activity behind the Iron Curtain, influences the lives of all ninety million inhabitants of the captive countries proper, and will have profound consequences of moral, political, economic, social, and strategic character not only for these countries but for the world as a whole. From the European point of view, the industrial revolution of Eastern Europe is an outstanding historical event, comparable in its implications to the great wars of the present century. We are witnessing

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an industrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain. 185
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This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolutionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study. 121

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Communist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and industrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be 185
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162 CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

439 Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
185 Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 *

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)	Free World
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

- 185 The social policies of the satellite governments follow in
 ● 661 their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union
 642 but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only
 because the respect for human values has been more deeply
 ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than
 they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

* P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times (Moscow)*, No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal¹⁸⁵ dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental⁶⁶¹ concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons⁶⁴² of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe^[511] cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently denied⁵¹¹ by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A⁰⁰⁰ trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis ¹⁷⁸ in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had ⁴³³ enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and ³⁶⁹ many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradually eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the ⁶⁶¹ increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in ¹⁸⁵ the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military prepara- ⁶⁴⁹ tions. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

NOTES

000 1. Protokoll des II. Welt Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg: 1921), p. 390.

1a. "The Role of Brains in the Total State," Commentary, August 1953, pp. 167-173.

2. Quoted in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), p. 407.

Cf. also the following statement from the Kosice program of the new Czech government, March 27, 1945: "Commissioning and promoting of officers shall not be based on formal rules only; extraordinary faster advancement (or commissioning) of the ablest . . . shall be supported." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu (Prague: Svoboda, 1945), pp. 7-11.

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● 661 3. These were originally one. They were separated in Russia so the satellites followed suit. In 1950 Czechoslovakia, in November 1951 Poland, and September 1952 Romania, for example, separated them. Under the Malenkov regime in Russia, however, they were recombined under Beria. The satellites imitated and recombined them (e.g. the Czechs) in September 1953. After Beria was purged in Russia, they too were purged.

3a. But cf. Hans Speur, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951) p. 266.

3b. Cf. Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power (Mimeographed), Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953.

4. Spencer Wilkinson, War and Policy: Essays (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1910), p. 361.

5. Edward Shils and Morris J. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht" in Daniel Lerner, Propaganda—War and Crisis (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 373.

5a. There is some reason to believe that in Russia itself after the death of Stalin the desired monolithic control was shaken. In the period before the purge of Beria, at least, there was a jockeying for power. Some observers believe that the Russian Army even now retains some potential independent power as against Malenkov and the party.

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874 6. Op. cit.

7. The emphasis in the period since 1948 on military training was fully foreshadowed in the plans of the Russians as revealed in the Kosice program of the new Czech government in 1945. This announced that the government "shall request from the Red Army professors and instructors for instruction in the Czechoslovak military schools. It shall endeavor to send the largest possible number of the ablest officers to Soviet military schools, up to the highest military institutes and academies." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu pp. 7-11.

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SATELLITE GENERALS

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* 648 He served with the 51st Artillery Regiment and with the Land Artillery Command in Prague. By 1935 he was a colonel and commander of the 51st Artillery Regiment. He became a brigadier general only in exile during World War II, during which he showed unusual capabilities of command.

000 11. We excluded from our sample those generals over sixty in 1945 who were not taken into active positions on the theory that this might conceivably have been due to age rather than political factors.

12. K. M. Smogorzewski, "Soviet Satellite Armies in Europe," The Fortnightly, MXVII N.S., September 1951, p. 602.

12a. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: the Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950), p. 30.

13. Op. cit.

14. Lidova Demokracie, July 12, 1950.

15. In addition there are in our sample two who returned and died of natural causes shortly after the war so that it is not possible to classify them as having been either purged or not purged.

16. It will be recalled that we are omitting from our sample of available officers those who were more than sixty on the theory that failure to incorporate them into the new armies might have been simply on the grounds of age.

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* 648 17. "Glos Polski," Toronto, Canada, September, 1951.

17a. A glance at the table of organization of the Polish high command makes clear how small a role the career officers ever played and how completely they have been eliminated from leadership now.

• 661 Minister of National Defense: Zymierski (career officer) to 11/6/49; Rokossovski (Russian) since.

Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff: Korczyz (Russian) 1945 on.

Deputy Minister and Commander of Land Forces: Swierczewski (Russian) to 3/28/47; Poplawsky (Russian) since.

Deputy Minister and Chief of the Political Department:

Several, all Polish C.P. militants.

Inspector Generals - all now Russian: Artillery, Engineers, Signal troops, Armored troops, etc.

Commander of the Air Force: Romeyko (Russian) to 1951;

Turkel (Russian) since.

Commander in Chief of Navy: Steyer (career officer) to 1949;

Cherokov (Russian) since.

Commanders of Military Districts

Warsaw: Passkiewicz (career officer) to 1948; Rotkevich (Russian) since.

Bydgoszcz: Snylingowski (Russian) 1945; Poltuzyski (Russian) now.

Wroclaw: Daniluk (career officer) to 1950; Strazhesky (Russian) since.

Cracow: Mossor (career officer) 1945; Kleniewicz (Russian) now.

NOTES

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17b. These few old officers who remain have been reduced to minor positions. One is a military attaché, one in the general staff academy, one is curator of the state race horses, and the fourth in some unidentifiable minor position. **701***
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18. It is not clear whether the last of these men is still actually in the position to which we are assigning him. He was in that position in 1951, but there is some reason to believe that his position may have changed.

19. Colonel Josef Jaklicz, "Armia," Kultura, II, special issue, Paris 1952, pp. 62-99. **600**

19a. Franciszek Jarecki, "Flights for Freedom Pierce Iron Curtain," Life, April 6, 1953, p. 32. Alexander T. Jordan, "Why Jarecki Flew West," Readers Digest, October 1953, pp. 110-14.

19b. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1953, p. 16.

19c. The intelligence school is different from the others in that candidates cannot volunteer for it directly. Intelligence officers are picked from among the other programs during the training period. **7**

19d. Jaklicz, op. cit.

20. Cf. Thomas, William I. and Znaniecki, Florian. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1927).

21. There are two journals of this name; one published in Poland and one in exile.

22. Bellona, 1948, Vol. 30 (1948) 2-3. London: Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego.

23. Chief of the Governing Board of the Department of Political Education of the Polish Army.

24. Deputy Chairman for War Industry.

24a. It might be noted that the same focus on a limited number of highly political names occurs even in the officers training program. Lieutenant Jazwinski reported that for his political courses he had to learn the names and positions of Marshal Rokossovski and the four vice-ministers of national defense. Besides those he knew about Generals Swierczewski (Walter), Zymiersky, and Radkiewica, all high-ranking political figures, past or current. In addition, he knew of General Romeyko, Commander of the Air Force at the time that Jazwinski was in school, and of General Turkel, his successor. For the rest he could not identify any of the Polish generals. This is merely one more indication of the severe limitation the Soviets put upon attention to broader political and military problems. Conversation focuses on divisional gossip concerning local people and events. The mass media focus on a few symbolic political figures. In between these two extremes there is a vast area about which communication and knowledge are severely restricted. This illustrates what Mr. Lerner has called the discipline of "limited perspectives."

25. Smogorzewski, op. cit., p. 597.

26. Markham, p. 413.